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ABSTRACT
AUTOPSY OF THE BANKING CRISIS: EXAMINING THE IMPACT OF
DIRECTOR CHARACTERISTICS ON BANK FAILURES
by
Gregory L. Prescott

The catastrophic impact of the recent financial crisis on the banking industry
reverberated throughout the United States and had contagion effects worldwide.
Congressional inquiries, media scrutiny, and the public alleged failure of the boards of
directors to effectively discharge their governance responsibilities. The objective of this
study was to investigate how certain characteristics of directors on a bank‘s board are
related to bank failure—specifically whether the presence of directors with banking
industry–specific experience and accounting expertise is related to a bank‘s likelihood of
failure. The study also examined how board director tenure is related to bank failure.
I employed a matched-pairs design of 65 failed and 65 nonfailed U.S. commercial
banks between 2008 and 2011. Matching was based on age, size, and geographic
markets. Logistic regression was used to analyze the hypothesized associations.
At the board level, I found a statistically significant and negative association
between director tenure and bank failure, supporting the resource dependence
perspective. I found no significant association between bank work or bank director
experience and bank failure. At the audit committee level, I found positive and significant
relationships among bank work experience, bank director experience, and bank failure,
suggesting overconfidence among audit committee members. Results for accounting
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expertise indicated that presence of a director on the audit committee that previously
worked as a chief financial officer, vice president of finance, or controller without a CPA
designation (POTACCTG) was significant and negatively associated with bank failure.
The average tenure of audit committee members was negatively and significantly
associated with bank failure, and the interactions between tenure and the two categories
of accounting expertise were also negatively and significantly related to bank failure.
Together, these results provide support for the expertise hypothesis: As directors gain
industry- and bank-specific knowledge during their tenure, they are able to provide more
effective oversight and prevent their banks from failing.

viii

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Title Page………………………………………………………………….....................

i

Copyright Page…………………………………………………………………………

ii

Signature Page....………………………………………………………………............

iii

Dedication…………………………………………………………….………………..

iv

Acknowledgements…………………………………………………………………….

v

Abstract………………………………………………………………………………... vii
Table of Contents………………………………….…………………………...…........

ix

List of Tables……………………………………….……………………….......……..

xi

Chapter 1: Introduction..……………………….………………………………………

1

Chapter 2: Literature Review and Hypotheses…...…………………………………… 10
Boards of Directors and Firm Performance…………………………………… 11
Boards of Directors and Bank Financial Performance...……………………… 12
Importance of Human Capital and Resource Dependence Theories ….……… 20
Banking Industry Expertise……………………………………………………

23

Accounting and Financial Expertise…………………………………………..

28

Director Tenure..………………………………………………………………

32

The Audit Committee ………………………………………………………… 36

ix

Chapter 3: Methodology..…………….……………………………………………….. 40
Determination of the Research Sample………………………………………..

40

Variables ……………………………………………………………………… 43
Data Analysis………………………………………………………………….

57

Chapter 4: Data Analysis and Results ………………………………………………...

58

Descriptive Statistics…………………………………………………………..

58

Supplemental Analysis………………………………………………………...

86

Chapter 5: Conclusions, Limitations, and Future Research.....…..……………………

88

Discussion……………………………………………………………………..

95

Limitations…………………………………………………………………….

98

References..……………………………………………………………..……………. 100

x

LIST OF TABLES
Table
1

Variable Definitions……………………………………………………………... 44

2

Frequencies and Percentages for Bank Board Characteristics…………………... 59

3

Percentages for Bank Board Characteristics by Bank Failure Status…………… 62

4

Frequencies and Percentages for Bank Audit Committee Characteristics……….63

5

Percentages for Bank Audit Committee Characteristics by Bank Failure Status.. 64

6

Descriptive Statistics for Control Variables Used in Models…………………… 65

7

Means for Board and Audit Committee Tenure by Bank Failure Status………... 67

8

Means for Control Variables Used in Models by Bank Failure Status………….. 68

9

Correlation Matrix for Test and Control Variables………………………………69

10

Results for Logistic Regression Testing of Hypotheses 1–4……………………. 73

11

Results for Logistic Regression Testing of Hypotheses 5–7……………………. 77

12

Results for Logistic Regression Testing of Hypotheses 8–11…………………... 81

13

Results for Logistic Regression Testing of Hypotheses 12–14…………………. 84

14

Summary Results of Logistic Regression Testing of Hypotheses 1–14………… 89

xi

CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
The objective of this study is to investigate how select characteristics of directors
on a bank‘s board and its audit committee are related to the bank‘s likelihood of failure.
According to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), 413 commercial banks
failed1 in the United States and Puerto Rico from January 2008 through the end of 2011.2
However, the number of bank failures does not fully convey the magnitude of the
banking crisis. These bank failures wiped out more than $17 billion of market
capitalization of the publicly owned banks and more than $12 billion of balance sheet
equity for the private banks.3 Moreover, the failures cost the FDIC‘s Deposit Insurance
Fund $86.9 billion (FDIC Annual Reports, 2010, 2011).
These costs, however, do not include the substantial societal costs associated with
financial crises. In their study of the effects of financial crises in both developed and
emerging market countries, Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) note that the economic costs of
financial crises tend to be severe and prolonged. Specifically, the authors report that on a
peak-to-trough basis, ―real housing price declines average 35 percent stretched out over
six years, while equity price collapses average 55 percent over a downturn of about three
1

A bank failure is defined by the FDIC as the ―closing of a bank by a federal or state banking regulatory
agency. Generally, a bank is closed when it is unable to meet its obligations to depositors and others‖
(http://www.fdic.gov/consumers/banking/facts/). This is the definition of bank failure adopted in this study.
2
See the Failed Bank List available at http://www.fdic.gov.
3
For the failed public banks, market capitalization was calculated by multiplying the stock‘s high price for
the fourth quarter of 2006 by the number of outstanding shares as of 12/31/2006. For the failed private
banks, stockholders‘ equity was obtained for each bank as of 12/31/2006 from the Federal Financial
Institutions Examination Council website at https://cdr.ffiec.gov/public/.

1

2
and a half years,‖ the unemployment rate rises an average of 7 percentage points during
the down cycle, and government debt tends to explode, ―rising an average of 86 percent
in the major post-World War II episodes‖ (Reinhart & Rogoff, 2009, p. 3). Although their
report was published in January 2009—well before the scale of the crisis in the United
States was known—it is beyond contention that the recent banking crisis resulted in
housing prices declining sharply, stock market indices losing significant amounts of
market capitalization, high and persistent levels of unemployment, and an unprecedented
ballooning of the federal budget deficit. The economic ramifications of bank failures
persist even today as banks have become more rigid in making loans in a bid to avoid
aggressive risk taking (Federal Reserve System Board of Governors, 2010). Moreover,
the crisis related to banks is not over. In May 2012, JPMorgan Chase reported a trading
loss that at the time was estimated at up to $9 billion (JPMorgan Chase & Co., 2012;
Silver-Greenberg & Craig, 2012), prompting immediate congressional action in the form
of a U.S. Senate Banking Committee hearing in which the bank‘s chief executive officer
(CEO), Jamie Dimon, was grilled over the obvious failure of the bank‘s risk management
system (Goldfarb, 2012). According to the firm‘s 2012 annual report to stockholders, the
trading loss eventually resulted in a $6.25 billion charge against earnings for that year.
Congressional inquiries into bank failures and media reports suggest that one of
the factors that potentially contributed to the bank failures was ineffective oversight on
the part of the internal watchdog, a bank‘s board of directors. Shortly after the initial
phase of the banking crisis, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) announced
plans ―to look into whether the boards of banks and other financial firms conducted
effective oversight leading up to the financial crisis‖ (Goldfarb, 2009, p. D1), part of a
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broader effort on the part of the SEC to intensify scrutiny of the top levels of
management and to give new powers to shareholders to shape boards.
However, we do not know if the failure of a bank‘s board of directors is a
contributing factor to the recent bank failures because of the lack of research. Over the
last three decades, researchers have directed substantial attention to characteristics of
boards of directors and their potential impact on firm performance (see Bebchuk &
Weisbach, 2010; Dalton, Daily, Ellstrand, & Johnson, 1998; Dalton, Daily, Johnson, &
Ellstrand, 1999; Finegold, Benson, & Hecht, 2007; Zahra & Pearce, 1989). The findings
of this literature remain mixed and inconclusive. Despite the vital role of commercial
banks in the United States and international economic systems, there is considerably less
academic research on the governance policies and board structures in the banking
industry (Adams & Mehran, 2003; Macey & O‘Hara, 2003). The limited bank-related
studies reviewed later provide ambiguous and equivocal results; some show that board
independence is not related to bank performance (e.g., Sierra, Talmor, & Wallace, 2006),
whereas others show that CEO duality (where the CEO is also the chairman of the board)
is positively related to bank performance (e.g., Simpson & Gleason, 1999). Some of the
inconsistency of the findings of these studies may be attributable to differing approaches
in measuring performance (Dalton et al., 1998; Zahra & Pearce, 1989). Accounting-based
measures have been criticized as being subject to manipulation by management through
accounting choices and for lacking standardization in the handling of international
accounting conventions. While many researchers consider market-based measures of
performance superior to accounting-based measures, they are often subject to forces
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beyond the control of management and directors. An advantage of the current study is
that it focuses on bank failure, an unambiguous and objective measure of performance.4
Additionally, no research has examined director characteristics in relation to the
recent bank failures, which some researchers have characterized as resulting from
excessive risk-taking by banks (Peni & Vähämaa, 2012). Echoing this sentiment, Federal
Reserve Chairman Ben S. Bernanke attributed the financial crisis, in part, to ―significant
defects in … risk management and risk controls‖ (Bernanke, 2010, p. 7). Furthermore,
the deficiencies in risk management were not limited to large financial institutions.
According to Bernanke, ―risk-management weaknesses were spread throughout the
financial system, including at many institutions that were neither large nor too-big-to-fail.
For example, problems with commercial real estate lending were concentrated in regional
and community banks‖ (Bernanke, 2010, p. 7).
Therefore, the objective of this study is to investigate how characteristics of
directors on a bank‘s board are related to the likelihood of bank failure. Specifically, the
study examines how the presence of directors with banking industry–specific experience
and accounting-based human capital on a bank‘s board is related to the likelihood of bank
failure. The study also examines how directors with bank-specific knowledge gained
through longer service (tenure) on a bank‘s board are related to bank failure. These
director characteristics are also examined at the audit committee level because the audit
committee is responsible for overseeing the risks related to financial reporting which, as
the banking crisis demonstrates, did not adequately reflect the risks undertaken by bank
management.

4

It must also be acknowledged that bank failure has the disadvantage of being a rather extreme measure of
poor performance.
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To execute the study consistent with prior bank failure research (Espahbodi, 1991;
Lane, Looney, & Wansley, 1986; Meyer & Pifer, 1970), a matched-pairs design is
adopted using a sample of U.S. commercial bank failures between 2008 and 2011. A
matched-pairs design is appropriate because of the need to hand-collect most of the data
required for the empirical analyses. For example, data on director characteristics need to
be hand-collected from proxy statements filed with the SEC. As bank failure is a
dichotomous variable, the study will use a logistic regression technique to model the
likelihood of bank failure on director and audit committee member attributes while
controlling for a number of other factors (Hair, Black, Babin, & Anderson, 2010).
This study makes several important contributions. Given the magnitude of the
financial, economic, social, and psychological impacts of the recent financial crisis, this
study provides a timely and first examination of the role of corporate governance in the
recent bank failures. Regulators, media, and the public have criticized banks‘ boards of
directors for failing in their fiduciary duties (Pozen, 2010). This study provides initial
evidence to such claims and helps inform regulators with future policy formulations.
Specifically, my findings indicate there is a positive and statistically significant
relationship between directors possessing previous bank work experience and bank
failure—at both the board level as well as the audit committee level. These results call
into question the practice of banks having directors with previous bank work experience
on their boards and suggests a level of expert overconfidence and cognitive
entrenchment. Furthermore, by themselves, neither category of accounting expertise of
interest in this study—work as a CPA or in public accounting or work as a chief financial
officer, vice president of finance, or controller—was a significant deterrent to bank
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failure at the board level, but work experience as a chief financial officer, vice president
of finance, or controller was negative and significantly related to bank failure at the audit
committee level.
Some of the most interesting findings of the current study relate to director tenure.
As the average tenure of a bank‘s directors grew, the bank‘s likelihood of failure was
significantly diminished. Moreover, when average board tenure was interacted with bank
work experience and the two categories of accounting expertise studied here, the
interaction between average board tenure and bank work experience and the interaction
between average tenure and potential accounting expertise were negative and statistically
significant in relation to bank failure. These findings lend support to the rationale behind
the expertise hypothesis: Directors who have served for a greater number of years are
more likely to have gained substantial necessary knowledge over time, and thus are in a
better position to carry out their fiduciary responsibilities to stockholders and to provide
necessary oversight of senior management than directors with shorter board service.
This study contributes to the corporate governance academic literature in several
ways. First, it investigates the role of corporate governance in commercial banks, which
are financial pillars of society. Our understanding of the role of corporate boards in a
highly regulated but vital industry is hindered by the relatively limited and relevant
research (Adams & Mehran, 2003; Macey & O‘Hara, 2003). The banking industry
typically has been excluded from prior governance research on grounds that it is
regulated and has unique requirements that render banks less homogeneous than
industrial companies. The implications of the catastrophic and recent bank failures
suggest that the role of directors in the banking industry should not be ignored but instead
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investigated. Second, this study examines how board and audit committee characteristics
such as banking experience, accounting expertise, and tenure are related to bank failure.
Prior research on board characteristics and bankruptcy has tended to focus on board
independence, board size, and board composition (Daily & Dalton, 1994; Gales &
Kesner, 1994). Therefore, the current study extends the rather limited body of literature
on board characteristics and bankruptcy. Furthermore, no prior study in the banking
industry could be identified examining the role of a director‘s industry-specific
experience and accounting expertise in relation to either bank performance or bank
failure. Therefore, this study contributes to the bank failure literature.
A third contribution of the current study is that it adds to the growing body of
literature on accounting expertise that has taken on additional significance since the
passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) and its requirement that a company‘s
audit committee include at least one ―financial expert‖ or disclose the reasons for not
having such an individual. In light of the fact that the SEC adopted a broad definition of
financial expertise when it developed the rules implementing the SOX requirement
(Dhaliwal, Naiker, & Navissi, 2010), several researchers have subsequently investigated
whether or not the type of financial expertise represented on the audit committee impacts
market perceptions (DeFond, Hann, & Hu, 2005), accounting conservatism (Krishnan &
Visvanathan, 2008), internal control quality (Krishnan, 2005), financial restatements
(Abbott, Parker, & Peters, 2004), and accruals quality (Dhaliwal et al., 2010). Yet,
commercial banks and other financial institutions often have been excluded from these
studies‘ samples (Abbott et al., 2004; DeFond et al., 2005; Dhaliwal et al., 2010;
Krishnan & Visvanathan, 2008). As a result, there is relatively little empirical evidence
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on the relationship between accounting expertise and bank performance. The current
study addresses this void.
This study also contributes to the literature on audit committee effectiveness in a
different way. While previous research links audit committees to various measures of
financial reporting quality (Abbott et al., 2004; Dhaliwal et al., 2010; Krishnan &
Visvanathan, 2008), none has examined the potential role audit committee directors can
play in relation to firm performance, and specifically, no study has investigated the
association between audit committees and firm failures. Various risk management
surveys and white papers document the important role audit committees can and should
play in relation to risk management from not only the financial reporting perspective but
also a strategic perspective (Beasley, 2010; COSO, 2010). The results suggest that
directors with a CPA on the audit committee are not effective in preventing bank failure,
but directors possessing experience as a CFO, controller, or similar senior executive
accounting position are more beneficial in relation to bank failure. One explanation for
this finding is that directors with a CPA designation may be focused on complying with
generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) and other bank reporting regulations,
whereas non-CPA accounting experts bring greater and broader perspective in relation to
bank performance.
Another contribution is that the current study employs an observable and
objective outcome—bank failure—rather than relying on the much-criticized accountingand market-based measures of firm performance used in most prior studies on firm
performance and director characteristics. Market-based measures (e.g., stock prices) tend
to respond to news, events, and economic developments that are not necessarily a direct
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consequence of directors‘ actions. Accounting-based performance measures are
predicated on a myriad of management choices and assumptions. Evaluating performance
against such measures can be subjective. However, evaluating a bank‘s performance
using failure provides a more objective analysis as the performance outcome is known
(failed or not failed).
Finally, previous research on director characteristics and firm performance has
tended to focus on large corporations—Fortune 500, S&P 500, and Forbes 500
companies—in part because of data availability (Dalton et al., 1998; Zahra & Pearce,
1989). Yet, few of those studies have controlled for interindustry differences (Zahra &
Pearce, 1989). By focusing on the commercial banking industry in the United States
during the four-year period in question, the study‘s sample comprises commercial banks
with relatively homogeneous operational characteristics—thereby helping to control for
unspecified factors that can threaten a study‘s internal validity (Sierra et al., 2006).
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Guided by theory in the areas
of resource dependence and experience-based human capital, in the next section I review
the relevant literature and develop testable hypotheses. The third section outlines the
research method, including a description of the sample, an explanation of the study‘s
variables, and discussion of the statistical technique used to analyze the data. The fourth
section includes the results of the logistic regression tests of the study‘s hypotheses. The
final section includes a discussion of the study‘s main findings, highlights the primary
limitations of the study, and discusses avenues for future research.

CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT

In this section, I briefly review select studies on the association between board
composition and firm performance, including bankruptcy. Next, I turn my attention to
literature on the relationship between board composition and bank performance, and the
association between board composition and bank failure. I use both the resource
dependence and human capital perspectives throughout this discussion. As there are no
previous studies on directors‘ industry experience or their accounting/financial expertise
in relation to bank performance or bank failure, I draw on the audit firm industry
specialization and audit committee literature to develop my hypotheses.
In their widely cited work on boards of directors and corporate financial
performance, Zahra and Pearce (1989) indicate that much of that research has been
guided by four distinct theoretical perspectives: the resource dependence view, the
legalistic perspective, the class hegemony view, and agency theory. From a resource
dependence perspective, an organization‘s success is dependent upon its ability to acquire
scarce and essential resources (Pfeffer, 1972; Ulrich & Barney, 1984), such as knowledge
and capital. Thus, boards of directors are viewed as providing vital resources or helping
their firms secure essential resources through linkages to the external environment (Gales
& Kesner, 1994; Pfeffer, 1972) that might otherwise be unattainable, thereby enhancing
company performance. In fact, Zahra and Pearce report that compared with the legalistic
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perspective, class hegemony, and agency theory, there is strong empirical support for the
resource dependence view when investigating the relationship between boards and
company performance.
Boards of Directors and Firm Performance
It is not surprising that the impact of directors on their firms‘ financial
performance has been the focus of much attention from the academic community.
Moreover, in recent years a number of corporate governance reforms aimed at boards of
directors and subcommittees of the board have been enacted by the U.S. Congress (for
example, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002) and by national stock exchanges (the
NASDAQ and the NYSE). Finegold et al. (2007) provide a comprehensive review of the
academic research on corporate boards and firm performance by extending Zahra and
Pearce (1989).
In their review, Finegold et al. (2007) include empirical studies published in the
main peer-reviewed journals after 1989, the final year covered by Zahra and Pearce
(1989). Finegold et al. identify 105 studies and organize their review around the
following topics: duality in the board structure, insider-outsider ratio in the board
structure, size and stability of the board structure, equity ownership of board members,
director rewards, and shareholder activism and corporate governance ratings. They
conclude that the extant literature on the subject provides little evidence of a systematic
relationship between these various board characteristics and firm performance. However,
the authors note that one meta-analysis of 27 studies that featured a board size variable
found that having more directors was associated with higher levels of firm performance,
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and that overall, the majority of studies on shareholder activism and firm performance
report some positive impact.
Boards of directors and firm bankruptcy have been the focus of less academic
attention. Two studies that examine this issue were published in 1994. Gales and Kesner
(1994) use a matched-pairs design to examine a sample of 127 bankrupt and 127
nonbankrupt firms. The researchers conclude the following: (a) in the two-year period
before a bankruptcy declaration, the boards of firms that filed bankruptcy were
significantly smaller than their nonbankrupt counterparts; (b) bankrupt firms had
significantly fewer outsiders on their boards in the two-year period preceding the
bankruptcy declaration; (c) there was no significant difference in the number of outsiders
on boards of bankrupt and nonbankrupt firms at the time of bankruptcy filing; and (d)
bankrupt firms engaged in more changes to their boards than the nonbankrupt firms in the
two years following bankruptcy. Daily and Dalton (1994) employ logistic regression to
analyze certain corporate governance policies of 57 large U.S. firms that declared
bankruptcy between 1972 and 1982 and 57 surviving matched firms. The researchers
report that bankrupt firms were more likely than the surviving firms to have a CEO who
also served as the chairman of the board and to have a higher proportion of affiliated
directors. The researchers also report a significant and positive interaction between these
two governance structures in distinguishing between the bankrupt and surviving firms.
Boards of Directors and Bank Financial Performance
There is markedly less academic research on the governance policies and board
structures in the banking industry than for other industries (Adams & Mehran, 2003;
Macey & O‘Hara, 2003). In examining the relationship between board structure and
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ownership and financial distress, Simpson and Gleason (1999) analyze data on 287
publicly traded commercial banks with complete financial and proxy statement
availability for 1989. They report a lower probability of financial distress when the CEO
is also the chair of the board, but other governance factors (management and board
member equity ownership in the bank, board size, the percentage of insiders on the board,
and CEO equity ownership) were not statistically significant. The researchers controlled
for book value to total assets, nonperforming assets to total assets, market value per share
to book value per share, and book value of total equity capital to total assets. Each was
highly statistically significant (p < .01) except for the ratio of market value to book value
per share.
Using a sample of 67 of the 100 largest (in assets) commercial bank holding
companies5 on December 31, 1990 for which pay-performance sensitivity data were
available and guided by the substitution-monitoring hypothesis, Mishra and Nielsen
(2000) find that ―a substitution relation exists between pay-related incentives and the
tenure of independent outside directors relative to the CEO‖ (Mishra & Nielsen, 2000, p.
65), suggesting that these two variables may be substituted for one another in order to
maintain bank performance. Overall, the authors report a significant and positive
relationship between board independence (measured as the percentage of outside
directors on the board and as the relative tenure of the outside directors in relation to the
CEO) and bank performance (measured as both return on assets [ROA] and return on
equity [ROE]). While the study‘s results are reported based on the dependent variable of
ROA only, the authors indicate they found similar results when ROE was the dependent
5

The Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council website defines a bank holding company as an
entity that owns and/or controls one or more U.S. banks or one that owns, or has a controlling interest in,
one or more banks.
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variable. Other study variables include size, the ratio of market value to book value, CEO
pay-related incentives, ownership by inside directors, ownership by outside affiliated
directors, ownership by outside independent directors, CEO duality, the interaction
between board independence and CEO pay-related incentives, and the interaction among
board independence and CEO duality, CEO ownership, CEO tenure, and state takeover
restrictions. The following variables were statistically significant (p < .05) under both
board independence measures: percentage ownership by outside affiliated directors,
percentage ownership by outside independent directors, CEO duality, and the interaction
of board independence and CEO duality. The market-to-book ratio was significant only
when board independence was defined as percentage of outside directors, whereas CEO
pay-related incentives and the interaction of board independence and CEO pay-related
incentives were statistically significant (p < .05) only when board independence was
defined as the relative tenure of outside directors in relation to the tenure of the CEO.
In their study of CEO ownership and the performance of the 100 largest U.S. bank
holding companies included in Stern Stewart & Co.‘s database for the years 1995–1999,
Griffith, Fogelberg, and Weeks (2002) use economic measures of bank performance and
report a nonlinear relationship between CEO ownership and bank performance. The
authors find that performance improves ―until the CEO‘s holdings reach approximately
12 percent and then declines until his or her ownership reaches 67 percent‖ of the bank
(Griffith et al., 2002, p. 182). In attempting to explain their results, the authors suggest
that due to inadequate diversification of their own investments, CEOs may accept
suboptimal returns in order to reduce bank-specific risk. The authors do not find an
association between CEO duality and bank performance. The study‘s economic measures
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of performance include Economic Value Added (EVA), Market Value Added (MVA),
and Tobin‘s Q. For measures of ownership and control, the researchers use the following
variables: CEO duality, CEO tenure, CEO age, the ratio of insiders on the board, the ratio
of insiders‘ ownership in the holding company to total ownership, and the ratio of the
CEO‘s ownership to total ownership. After calculating correlation coefficients, the
authors conclude that only CEO duality and the ratio of CEO‘s ownership to total
ownership were sufficiently uncorrelated with the other variables to be included in the
model.6 Therefore, the CEO duality variable and the two ownership variables (for
insiders and the CEO) were retained and the other ownership and control variables were
dropped. When testing for the significance of CEO duality, the researchers add as
explanatory variables the log of total assets and the ratio of total loans to total assets;
these additional test variables had been used as control variables in previous models
employed in the study. Overall, the study‘s results include a finding that there is a
significant and negative relationship among CEO ownership and the MVA and Tobin‘s Q
measures of bank performance; when bank performance is measured as EVA, the authors
report a significantly positive nonlinear relationship between CEO ownership and
performance.
From a sample of 35 bank holding companies over a period from 1959–1999,
Adams and Mehran (2005) fail to find evidence of a systematic relationship between the
proportion of outside directors and bank holding company performance.7 Contrary to
6

A review of the correlation matrix suggests the authors did not use an established correlation threshold for
the Pearson Correlations measures in evaluating the potential for multicollinearity and their decision to
eliminate certain variables. Also, the authors did not report how they made their decisions to eliminate
variables based on the significance of the correlations between the variables.
7
The authors initially focus on the period from 19861999, a period associated with increased merger and
acquisition activity and the widespread adoption of the bank holding company structure in the banking
industry. In attempting to develop alternative explanations for their results, the authors subsequently extend
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evidence for nonfinancial firms, the authors did not find a negative relationship between
board size and bank holding company performance. The following test variables are
included in the study: board size, fraction of noninsiders on the board, a capital ratio, a
volatility of stock price measure, total assets, bank holding company organizational
structure variables (the number of Tier 1 subsidiaries, the number of Tier 1 foreign
banking subsidiaries, the number of foreign nonbanking subsidiaries, the number of U.S.
states of Tier 1 subsidiaries, the average number of U.S. subsidiaries per state, and the
relative size of the lead bank in the holding company), and bank holding company
performance measures (Tobin‘s Q and ROA). The authors also include the following
control variables: number of committees, committee members divided by number of
committees, percentage of committees chaired by outsiders, the average number of
committees per chair, meetings per year, meeting fees paid to directors, average other
directorships for outsiders, average other directorships for insiders, dummy if board
interlock exists, percentage of CEO ownership, dummy if directors are paid deferred
compensation, and dummy if directors are paid deferred stock compensation. The
following variables were statistically significant when bank performance was measured
as Tobin‘s Q and as ROA: the capital ratio, the volatility of stock price (in most model
specifications), the number of Tier 1 subsidiaries, and the number of Tier 1 foreign
nonbanking subsidiaries (in two of four model specifications). In addition, the following
variables were significant only when bank performance was measured as ROA: the
number of U.S. states of Tier 1 subsidiaries, the relative size of the lead bank, the number
of committees, the meeting fees paid to directors, the average of other directorships for

their analysis to include the period from 1959–1985, when bank mergers and the bank holding company
structure were less common.
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insiders, the percentage of CEO ownership, the existence of a board interlock, and
directors being paid in deferred stock compensation.
In their study of 76 bank holding companies from 1992–1997 for which executive
compensation data were available in S&P‘s ExecuComp database, Sierra et al. (2006)
report that the relative strength of the board of directors is positively associated with bank
size and bank financial performance measured as ROA and negatively associated with
CEO compensation. The authors create an overall measure of board strength from a
composite of seven individual board characteristics, each of which is given equal weight.
The following characteristics are incorporated into the board strength variable:
percentage of board members who are executives of the company, percentage of outside
directors in which a company officer serves on that outside director‘s board, percentage
of directors who either are family members of the CEO or have contracts with the
company, percentage of directors who are outside directors and sit on at least two other
boards, percentage of directors who are outside directors and over the age of 65, whether
the CEO also serves as the chairman of the board, and the total number of board
members. For the board strength variable, the authors assign a value of one if the
composite score is in the bottom quartile, two if it is in the two middle quartiles, and
three if it is in the top quartile. The authors indicate that the board strength variable was
constructed such that ―a higher value represents a potentially more independent and
effective board and therefore a theoretically stronger board‖ (p. 111). (However, the
authors do not discuss how the individual characteristics composing board strength are
related to bank performance.) In addition to the board strength variable, the study also
includes variables for CEO compensation (a composite variable including salary, bonus,
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long-term incentive plan payouts, the value of restricted stock granted during the year,
the value of employee stock options granted during the year, and stock appreciation rights
granted during the year), total assets, the ratio of market value of equity to the book value
of equity, the tenure of the CEO in years, the sensitivity of the CEO‘s stock and options
holdings to a 1% change in stock price, regulatory supervisory ratings, the proportion of
risk-priced funding to total assets, and returns to stockholders (measured as dividends
plus stock appreciation divided by beginning of the year share price). The only significant
explanatory variables for bank performance were board strength, total assets, and CEO
compensation.
Using a sample of 69 large commercial banks from 6 developed countries
(Canada, U.S., U.K., Spain, France, and Italy) and financial information for the years
1995–2005, Andres and Vallelado (2008) report significant inverted U-shaped
relationships between bank performance and board size, and between the proportion of
nonexecutive directors and bank performance. No significant results are reported for
number of board meetings. The results indicate diminishing returns after board size and
the percentage of outside directors reach optimum levels.8 These results are consistent
across the three measures of bank performance including Tobin‘s Q, ROA, and
shareholders‘ annual market returns. Control variables include size, business mix,
regulation, market power of the banking industry, bank ownership structure, and
investors‘ legal protection.
In the single study addressing the relationship between certain corporate
governance policies and the financial performance of non–publicly traded banks, Cooper

8

In this study‘s sample, the optimum board size was approximately 19 directors, and the optimum
percentage of outside directors was approximately 80%.
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(2009) uses confidential data contained in regulatory examinations and financial data as
of year-end 2005 for 296 community banks in the United States. Using a simultaneous
regression approach, the researcher finds statistically significant and positive
relationships between each of the following variables and bank performance (measured
as ROA): the size of a bank, a bank‘s CAMELS rating, a bank CEO‘s tenure, and board
size. CAMELS ratings—explained in more detail later—are designed to assess the
overall financial health of banks and are assigned by bank regulatory bodies after
periodic on-site bank examinations. Among the other variables included in the study are
the percentage of insiders on the board, the total equity divided by total assets, CEO
duality, the percentage of women directors, and the percentage of directors over the age
of 65.
In summary, it is fair to say that research has failed to document a consistent and
clear association between corporate governance variables and the financial performance
of both commercial firms and banks. The board composition research has largely been
motivated by agency relationships, and therefore the focus has been on the boards‘
monitoring role of management. A striking omission from all of the prior bank-related
studies is the industry experience and accounting expertise of the directors. This study
addresses this shortcoming and complements previous research—which has tended to
employ agency theory—by assessing how the resources provided by directors may affect
bank survival. It does so by employing theories on experience-based human capital and
resource dependence.
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Importance of Human Capital and Resource Dependence Theories
In their widely cited work on boards of directors and corporate financial
performance, Zahra and Pearce (1989) propose a model that includes three important
board roles: service, strategy, and control. Service involves enhancing the company‘s
reputation, helping the company establish contacts with its external environment, and
providing counsel to the company‘s senior executives (Carpenter, 1988; Louden, 1982; as
cited in Zahra & Pearce, 1989). Their model suggests that the strategic role includes
directors providing advice and counsel to the company‘s senior executives, initiating their
own analyses of strategic options and suggesting strategic alternatives. The control
function requires directors to evaluate the performance of the company and senior
executives, and protect shareholders‘ interests (Chapin, 1986; Louden, 1982; as cited in
Zahra & Pearce, 1989). Despite the multidimensional nature of directors‘ roles in the
corporate governance function, researchers have most often focused on the board‘s
responsibility to monitor or control senior management as a means of protecting
stockholders‘ interests (Dalton et al., 1998; Hillman & Dalziel, 2003; Zahra & Pearce,
1989). It is not surprising, therefore, that researchers have relied heavily on agency theory
to guide their research (Daily, Dalton, & Cannella, 2003; Finegold et al., 2007; Hillman
& Dalziel, 2003; Zahra & Pearce, 1989), although there is only a moderate level of
empirical support for agency theory in this context (Zahra & Pearce, 1989).
An alternative theoretical perspective—resource dependence theory—has been
employed to a significantly lesser extent than agency theory when exploring the
relationship between boards and firm performance (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003), yet there is
strong but somewhat limited empirical support for the tenets of resource dependence in

21
this context (Zahra & Pearce, 1989). From a resource dependence standpoint, directors
possess skills, talents, and abilities acquired through education and experience that
enhance the resources available to the boards they serve on (Hillman, Cannella, & Harris,
2002).
Despite the fact that directors are widely acknowledged as providing senior
management with advice and counsel, the topic of directors‘ knowledge and skills in
fulfilling their governing responsibilities has received little attention from corporate
governance scholars (Kor & Sundaramurthy, 2009). Instead, it appears that until recently
there has been an implicit assumption that directors possess the depth of knowledge and
skills required by their fiduciary roles. Within the last few years, however, researchers
have begun to question that assumption (Carpenter & Westphal, 2001; Carter & Lorsch,
2004).
A component of resource dependence is that of human capital. Becker (1993)
defines human capital as an individual‘s set of competencies, knowledge, and skills. Such
capital is typically developed through investments in education, training, and professional
work experience. There is a substantial body of research focusing on the human capital of
top management teams and professional employees (Hitt, Bierman, Shimizu, & Kochhar,
2001; Kor & Leblebici, 2005). With respect to boards of directors, some scholars have
proposed that directors‘ human capital impacts their ability to provide advice and counsel
to management and to fulfill their monitoring and oversight responsibilities (Hillman &
Dalziel, 2003). Cravens and Wallace (2001, p. 9) posit that directors, especially outside
directors, ―bring their individual expertise to the board based upon their own knowledge
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and experience. This expertise often stems from a director‘s employment history with
various firms during his or her career.‖
The theoretical arguments for applying resource dependence and human capital
theories to boards of directors are supported by anecdotal evidence. For instance,
although Citigroup had 18 directors (including 16 who were independent), in early 2008,
only one of those directors had ever worked at a financial services firm, and that
individual was simultaneously the CEO of a large entertainment company (Pozen, 2010).
Also, in its 2011 Public Company Governance Survey, the National Association of
Corporate Directors (NACD) reports that public company directors cited ―specific
industry experience‖ and ―financial expertise‖ as two of the top three attributes and
experiences that are most important when they recruit new directors to their boards
(NACD, 2011). The third attribute was ―leadership experience,‖ which was not defined in
the open-ended survey question. As the data sources used in this study do not include
information on directors‘ leadership experience, this attribute will not be included in this
study.
Moreover, in response to calls by investors for additional information that would
enhance their ability to make informed voting and investing decisions, in 2009 the SEC
released a final rule regarding proxy disclosure enhancements that became effective
February 28, 2010 (SEC, 2009). Those enhancements:
require companies to disclose for each director and any nominee for
director the particular experience, qualifications, and attributes or skills
that led the board to conclude that the person should serve as a director for
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the company as of the time that a filing containing this disclosure is made
with the Commission. (SEC, 2009, p. 34)
The new rule also requires disclosure if ―particular skills, such as risk assessment or
financial reporting expertise, were part of the specific experience, qualifications,
attributes or skills that led the board or proponent to conclude that the person should
serve as a director‖ (SEC, 2009, p. 35). The final rule requires that these disclosures be
made annually. Thus, it is clear that regulators and directors are placing increasing
importance on both the industry experience and the financial expertise of directors.
Banking Industry Expertise
It is widely acknowledged that human capital is developed over time and that
individual directors bring unique resources to their organizations as a result of their
professional backgrounds, their technical skills and expertise, their industry work
experience, and their life experiences (Kesner, 1988). Occupational differences, one
aspect of human capital, ―reflect the heterogeneity of resources such as expertise, skill,
information, and potential linkages to other external constituencies‖ (Hillman et al., 2002,
p. 749).
In an effort to develop a more complete understanding of boards, Hillman,
Cannella, and Paetzold (2000) develop a taxonomy with four distinct categories of
directors: insiders, business experts, support specialists, and community influentials.
According to this framework, support specialists are directors who provide specialized
expertise on law, banking, insurance, or public relations and are typically employed
(currently or formerly) as lawyers, bankers, marketing professionals, and public relations
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experts.9 Support specialists are somewhat analogous to directors with bank work
experience and bank director experience—the types of directors that are the focus of this
study.
Resource dependence theory asserts that directors bring to their boards a bundle
of resources: expertise, different perspectives, relationships with other firms, and
legitimacy (Hillman et al., 2002). Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) state that directors benefit
their firms by providing vital resources—either directly or by assisting them through their
connections with external parties—and by helping management to set and monitor the
firm‘s business strategies. ―Resource dependence theory embraces the view that board
members enhance the value of the firm through developing and monitoring a firm‘s
strategic responses to deal with the dynamic and competitive environment‖ (Sharma,
Boo, & Sharma, 2008, p. 107).
A number of studies published in recent years employ the resource dependence
perspective and contend that directors‘ ability to fulfill their fiduciary responsibilities is
predicated on their relevant industry knowledge, their professional business experience,
and their basic understanding of the firm‘s competitive position. Thus, a board composed
of directors with industry-specific experience is likely to perform its duties more
effectively (Cohen, Wright, & Krishnamoorthy, 2007; Hillman & Dalziel, 2003; Sharma,
2006). In fact, Robert Pozen, who has been the president or chairman of two global
financial firms, an independent director of several large industrial companies, and a well9

Insiders are defined as those directors who currently serve or have served as active managers, employees,
or owners of the firm. They provide the board with information about the firm itself and its competitive
environment. Business experts are defined as active or retired executives in other for-profit organizations
and directors who serve on other corporate boards. They serve as sounding boards for ideas and provide
alternative viewpoints on internal and external problems. Community influentials are defined as directors
who bring to the board nonbusiness perspectives on issues, problems, and ideas. They often have expertise
about and influence with powerful community groups.
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known corporate governance scholar, recently proposed the concept of a professional
board (Pozen, 2010). One aspect of his proposal is that most directors would be required
to have extensive expertise in their companies‘ lines of business.
In the absence of prior studies on industry-specific experience in the banking
industry, I draw on literature on human capital, auditor industry specialization, and audit
committee industry specialists to support my first hypothesis related to the presence of
directors with bank work experience on a bank‘s board of directors.
Several studies support the view that human intellectual capital positively impacts
firm value (Black & Lynch, 1996; Carpenter, Sanders, & Gregersen, 2001; Hitt et al.,
2001). However, these studies have tended to focus on the intellectual capital of
employees (Kalyta, 2011). Only recently have researchers begun to consider the
intellectual capital of a company‘s directors and its potential to positively impact
company performance and value. For instance, McDonald, Westphal, and Graebner
(2008) propose and find support for the idea that outside directors‘ previous experience
with acquisitions has a positive impact on the success of their companies‘ corporate
acquisitions.
Kalyta (2011) takes a broader perspective and proposes that a board‘s intellectual
capital will positively influence firm value in knowledge-intensive industries, such as
information technology, chemical products, and pharmaceuticals. Specifically, he uses
the number of scientists on the board as a proxy for the board‘s intellectual capital and
posits that ―boards with strong scientific expertise are more likely to make and approve
effective strategic decisions concerning R&D related acquisitions, major product
innovations or new scientific initiatives than boards with limited scientific experience‖
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(Kalyta, 2011, p. 3). Using the population of publicly listed U.S. companies for 2008,
Kalyta first identifies companies with one or more directors with a doctoral degree (the
author uses the terms ―director-scientist‖ and ―director with a Ph.D.‖ interchangeably)
and then identifies companies that appointed at least one such director between 2004 and
2008. Using Tobin‘s Q as the measure of firm value, Kalyta reports that the appointment
of a scientist director in a knowledge-intensive industry is associated with a sizable
increase in firm value, but he finds no such significant association in other industries.
Kalyta also finds that the appointment of scientist directors in knowledge-intensive
industries increases the stock price in a three-day window around the announcement by
1%, while the 12-month postevent period is characterized by a positive abnormal return
of up to 2.5%. The same effect is not observed in other industries. Overall, these results
suggest that ―scientists on the board of directors constitute a significant asset and a driver
of superior performance in knowledge-intensive sectors‖ (p. 5) and that ―directors‘
knowledge has a significant impact on firm value, over and above other measures of
‗good‘ governance used in previous research‖ (p. 5).
While not related to firm performance, the literature on auditor-industry
specialization and audit committee industry experience further illustrates the value of
industry-specific knowledge to the firm. The central premise of the auditor-industry
specialization literature is that specialized industry knowledge is critical for auditors to
discharge their professional responsibilities with high quality. For instance, Krishnan
(2003, p. 2) states that ―auditors who have a more comprehensive understanding of an
industry‘s characteristics and trends will be more effective in auditing than auditors
without such industry knowledge.‖ The established auditor-industry specialization
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literature has consistently demonstrated that specialist auditors provide higher quality
services than auditors who are not industry specialists (Balsam, Krishnan, & Yang, 2003;
Bedard & Biggs, 1991; Johnson, Jamal, & Berryman, 1991; Krishnan, 2003; Owhoso,
Messier, & Lynch, 2002; Romanus, Maher, & Fleming, 2008), and that these specialist
auditors are more compliant with professional auditing standards (O‘Keefe, King, &
Gaver, 1994). Collectively, this literature concludes that the quality of the audit and the
resulting financial statements is higher when the auditor is an industry specialist than
when the auditor is not an industry specialist.
Market reaction studies (e.g., Knechel, Naiker, & Pacheco, 2007) provide further
evidence of the value of industry specialist auditors. Specifically, Knechel et al. report
that the market reacts positively to firms switching from a nonspecialist auditor to an
industry specialist auditor, while the market‘s reaction is negative when the successor
auditor is not an industry specialist.
In a study focusing on industry expertise on the audit committee of the board of
directors, Cohen, Hoitash, Krishnamoorthy, and Wright (2014) find a significantly lower
likelihood of a firm incurring an accounting restatement when industry experience is
represented on the audit committee. They posit that directors with experience in their
firms‘ industries will have a better understanding of the business and accounting issues,
and therefore be more capable of identifying complex issues that may not be apparent to
directors without such experience. However, Cohen et al. do not examine how industryrelevant experience of the directors is related to either firm performance or firm failure, a
gap which the current study is designed to address. Furthermore, Cohen et al. exclude
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regulated industries (including commercial banks) from their sample. I am not aware of
any published studies that examine the effects of directors‘ industry experience in banks.
In light of the evidence suggesting that industry specialist auditors provide higher
quality service than non–industry specialist auditors, and the finding that industry
experience of directors serving on the audit committee of the board of directors brings
more effective governance to the firm, it is a reasonable conjecture that directors with
commercial banking experience will bring similar industry-relevant expertise to their
boardroom responsibilities. Similarly, it is reasonable to conclude that directors with
experience on the boards of other banks (either previous or contemporaneous experience)
will also bring industry-specific expertise to their roles that will enhance their banks‘
survival prospects in the event of a difficult economic environment. Therefore, given the
theoretical support from the resource dependence and human capital theories, and
empirical results from the prior nonbanking literature suggesting a link between human
intellectual capital and firm value, the first research hypotheses are framed as follows:
H1: Banks with directors on the board possessing bank work experience will be
associated with a lower likelihood of failure.
H2: Banks with directors on the board possessing bank director experience will be
associated with a lower likelihood of failure.
Accounting and Financial Expertise
In response to numerous well-publicized accounting scandals early in the last
decade, the U.S. Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX). Section 407 of
SOX required the SEC to adopt rules mandating that the audit committee of the board of
directors of public firms include at least one member who is considered a ―financial

29
expert‖ or disclose reasons for not adopting this requirement (Dhaliwal et al., 2010).
Although SOX outlined a rather restrictive definition of financial expertise, including
only individuals with accounting or auditing experience, the SEC ultimately adopted a
broader definition of financial expertise that includes not only accounting but also certain
types of nonaccounting (finance and supervisory) financial expertise. Essentially, the
SEC‘s definition of a financial expert includes accountants as well as those with
experience as an investment banker, as a financial analyst, or in any other financial
management role, and individuals with supervisory experience overseeing the preparation
of financial statements—including CEOs and company presidents (Dhaliwal et al., 2010).
Several studies using pre-SOX data find that the presence of a financial expert on
the audit committee is positively related to the quality of financial reporting (Abbott et
al., 2004; Bédard, Chtourou, & Courteau, 2004). Similarly, Krishnan (2005) finds that
audit committees with financial expertise are significantly less likely to be associated
with the incidence of internal control problems, such as reportable conditions and
material weaknesses. The results of this literature are commensurate with the market‘s
perception of appointing directors with financial expertise. Public companies were not
required prior to the enactment of SOX to have at least one member of the audit
committee who met the definition of a financial expert (or disclose reasons for not having
one), but some companies chose to do so. DeFond et al. (2005) examine three-day
cumulative abnormal returns around the announcement of 702 newly appointed outside
directors assigned to audit committees. They observe a positive market reaction to the
appointment of accounting financial experts to audit committees but no such reaction to
the appointment of nonaccounting financial experts. This finding suggests that not all
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types of financial experts are perceived by the market as providing value; accounting
experts are presumed to provide more relevant expertise.
It is not surprising that post-SOX studies show that accounting experts are
associated with a higher quality system of internal controls over financial reporting and
higher quality financial statements (Dhaliwal et al., 2010; Hoitash, Hoitash, & Bedard,
2009; Krishnan & Visvanathan, 2008; Naiker & Sharma, 2009; Zhang, Zhou, & Zhou,
2007). The general idea emerging from these studies is that accounting experts have a
better understanding of the complexities associated with financial reporting in a postSOX environment and, leveraging their expertise, they are better able to identify and take
corrective actions if the financial information contains irregularities or mistakes.
It is important for management and other stakeholders to make economic
decisions based on information that is fairly and correctly prepared. Failure to do so can
lead to poor-quality decisions and adverse economic consequences. The Financial
Accounting Standards Board‘s (FASB) conceptual framework indicates that the objective
of general purpose financial reporting is to provide financial information about an entity
that is useful to existing and potential investors, lenders, and other creditors in making
decisions about providing resources to that entity (FASB, 2010). If financial information
is to be useful to decision makers, it must be relevant (capable of making a difference)
and faithfully represent what it purports to represent. Research supporting the concept of
financial information that is useful in a decision-making context in the banking industry
shows that bankers tend to make incorrect company failure prediction judgments when
they use financial information that is tainted, but make better-quality company failure
prediction judgments when the information is relatively free from the risk of
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misrepresentation (Sharma & Iselin, 2003a, b). Extending this notion to boards of
directors and firm performance suggests that boards will be able to make more-informed
economic decisions about the firm if the financial information presented to them is of
high quality.
The prior research reviewed above shows that directors with accounting expertise
are associated with higher quality financial information. Furthermore, when companies
seek advice and consulting services on turnaround strategies, they often turn to
accounting firms such as the Big 4 (KPMG, E&Y, PwC, Deloitte). In fact, a review of the
Big 4 firms‘ websites indicates that each firm has a sizable worldwide consulting
segment, and Deloitte‘s site refers to itself as the ―world‘s largest management consulting
firm.‖ Moreover, each site includes links to publications and individuals to contact
regarding ―turnaround‖ services. Clearly, the accounting and finance knowledge of the
experts at these firms is respected in the marketplace because it enables them to quickly
assess the causes of impending failure and to recommend corrective actions. Thus, boards
including accounting experts could be expected to have better-quality financial
information and make better-quality decisions about future performance, including
strategies for enhancing performance and avoiding calamities such as bankruptcy.
Therefore, based on the foregoing discussion, there is considerable empirical
support for the importance of having accounting expertise represented on boards of
directors, and the third hypothesis follows:
H3: Banks with directors on the board possessing accounting expertise will be
associated with a lower likelihood of failure.
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Employing the same logic that supports the first three hypotheses, the fourth
research hypothesis is as follows:
H4: Banks with directors on the board possessing bank work experience, bank
director experience, and accounting expertise will be associated with a relatively
lower likelihood of failure than banks with directors on the board possessing bank
work experience, bank director experience, or accounting expertise.
Director Tenure
The topic of director tenure and its potential to impact firm performance is an
empirical issue that has garnered substantially less attention from scholars than has
industry experience or accounting expertise. A partial explanation for the lack of focus on
director tenure may be that there is no clear hypothesis for the relationship between
director tenure and firm performance. Indeed, there are two competing views on this
subject.
The first view is that a director‘s ability to provide advice and counsel to senior
management and to monitor management on behalf of the stockholders is enhanced over
time. This expertise hypothesis ―suggests that a long-term director engagement is
associated with greater experience, commitment, and competence, because it provides a
director with important knowledge about the firm and its business environment‖ (Vafeas,
2003, p. 1044). The logic of this perspective is that directors acquire firm-specific
knowledge (e.g., the strengths and weaknesses of senior management) and industryspecific knowledge (with respect to the firm‘s competitive environment and business
strategy) over time that enhances their ability to meet their fiduciary responsibilities to
the stockholders.
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An argument can be made that the extended periods of economic expansion
experienced by the United States in recent decades has lengthened the ideal tenure of
directors—especially in the banking industry. Over the last three decades, the United
States has enjoyed prolonged periods of economic growth punctuated with relatively
brief periods of economic contraction in the early 1980s, the early 1990s, and the early
2000s until the Great Recession took hold in 2008 and led to the latest wave of significant
bank failures. Thus, during the last 30 years, it would have been possible for a director to
serve on a bank‘s board for an extended period of time without ever having to confront a
prolonged and pronounced economic downturn and the corresponding effects of
nonperforming loans, customer bankruptcies, etc.
Empirical results supporting the expertise-based tenure hypothesis are provided
by Bédard et al. (2004). In this study, the researchers examine the relationships among
the audit committee‘s expertise, independence, and activities and aggressive earnings
management using a sample of 300 U.S. companies. They find a negative relationship
between the average tenure of outside directors on the audit committee and the likelihood
of the firm reporting abnormal accruals (a measure of financial reporting quality). The
authors conclude that:
knowledge of the company‘s operations and of its executive directors
acquired through experience as a member of the board seems to be
effective in constraining aggressive earnings management and
complacency does not seem to offset the value of firm-specific knowledge
as tenure increases. (Bédard et al., 2004, p. 29)
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Similarly, Beasley (1996) reports that as the tenure of outside directors increases, the
likelihood of financial statement fraud decreases. Hence, these studies suggest that boards
composed of directors with longer tenure can be beneficial.
The second view is characterized by the management-friendliness hypothesis
(Vafeas, 2003). Under this framework, directors with longer tenures are more likely to
befriend executive management over time and less likely to aggressively monitor
management on behalf of the stockholders. The logic is that as social and business ties
develop between senior executives and outside directors, the directors become less
motivated to challenge management and are more of a rubber stamp for company
management. Indeed, there is anecdotal evidence that supports this perspective. For
instance, in 2001 Enron‘s board of directors was composed of several directors with 20 or
more years of service on the company‘s board or its predecessor companies‘ boards (U.S.
Senate, 2002). Therefore, it is not surprising that corporate governance advocates such as
the National Association of Corporate Directors and the Council of Institutional Investors
have proposed limits on director tenure (Sharma & Iselin, 2012).
However, there is limited empirical evidence supporting the managementfriendliness hypothesis. Sharma and Iselin (2012) report a significant and positive
relationship between the tenure of outside directors on the audit committee and financial
misstatements in a post-SOX period. They conclude that longer tenure of outside
directors results in ―an enduring association with management‖ that compromises ―the
effectiveness of their oversight responsibilities‖ (Sharma & Iselin, 2012, p. 30). Vafeas
(2003) also finds evidence that extreme board tenure may be detrimental to the interests
of stockholders. Specifically, he notes that longer-tenured directors serving on the
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compensation committee are more likely to be associated with significantly higher CEO
compensation and that the presence of directors with 20 or more years of service on the
board is more likely to be associated with CEO entrenchment. These two studies suggest
that boards composed of directors with longer tenure can have adverse economic
consequences for a company.
In summary, whether there is a systematic relationship between board tenure and
firm performance remains an open question. While there is limited empirical evidence
both in support of and against longer tenure, I am not aware of any empirical studies on
the association between board tenure and firm performance other than the Mishra and
Nielsen (2000) study discussed earlier, which addresses the tenure of independent board
members in relation to the tenure of the CEO. Accordingly, the next research hypothesis
is stated in the null form:
H5: There is no association between the tenure of directors on a bank‘s board and
the likelihood of bank failure.
Theories about the impact of director tenure can be extended to directors on the
board with banking experience and accounting expertise. Directors with banking
experience but serving for longer periods on a bank‘s board can either have accumulated
greater knowledge and insight, and thus be more effective in their monitoring and
advising roles, or succumb to managerial influences because of the developed friendship
ties. The same logic applies to directors with accounting expertise. Therefore, the
following two hypotheses are advanced:
H6: There is no association between the tenure of directors with bank work
experience on a bank‘s board and the likelihood of bank failure.
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H7: There is no association between the tenure of directors with accounting
expertise on a bank‘s board and the likelihood of bank failure.
The Audit Committee
Risk appetite is defined as ―the amount of risk, on a broad level, an organization
is willing to accept in pursuit of value‖ (Rittenberg & Martens, 2012, p. 1). The board of
directors is ultimately responsible for approving the risk appetite recommended by senior
executives and for monitoring and assessing a company‘s overall risk profile as
conditions change (Rittenberg & Martens, 2012). Yet, in a December 2010 report on
board risk oversight, a survey of more than 200 board members indicated that 50% of the
directors from financial services companies reported that their boards are not executing
mature and robust risk oversight processes (COSO, 2010). In fact, in evaluating the
overall effectiveness of their boards‘ risk oversight programs, only 12% of board
members rated their processes as highly effective, while 47% responded that their
processes either were ineffective or needed some improvement. Perhaps even more
telling is the fact that only 13% of the responding directors indicated their boards‘
monitoring of the risk management process was performed as a ―robust and mature
activity, with the board satisfied with the supporting process‖ (COSO, 2010, p. 10).
Substantial percentages of the directors responded that the supporting process for
monitoring changes in the environment that could impact both corporate strategy and
associated risks either was done on an ad hoc basis or was not performed at all. Perhaps
in an effort to prod companies into developing and funding risk monitoring activities and
as a means of enhancing investors‘ ability to evaluate whether the board‘s oversight of a
company‘s risk management activities is appropriate, the final rule issued by the SEC in
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2009 and discussed earlier also requires enhanced proxy disclosures regarding the
board‘s role in the risk oversight process (SEC, 2009). One consequence of the financial
crisis that is the motivation for this study is an increased focus on the effectiveness of
boards‘ oversight responsibilities with respect to corporate risk management (COSO,
2009).
In reality, however, the full board often delegates its risk oversight role to the
audit committee (Deloitte, 2011). In fact, two relatively recent reports have indicated that
the audit committee is the primary committee responsible for monitoring corporate risks
(64% per Deloitte, 2011) or that the audit committee has extensive involvement in risk
oversight across the entire organization (59% per COSO, 2010). Hence, in addition to
their responsibilities associated with the financial reporting function, a company‘s system
of internal controls, and dealing with the internal audit function as well as the external
auditors, audit committee members at most public companies are also accountable for
evaluating and monitoring their companies‘ risk profiles on an ongoing basis.
In light of criticisms of excessive risk-taking by banks from academic researchers
(Peni & Vähämaa, 2012) as well as the Chairman of the Federal Reserve (Bernanke,
2010), it appears that an examination of the audit committees of commercial banks during
the latest banking crisis is both warranted and necessary. In their analysis, Cole and
White (2012) cite excessive risk in banks‘ loan portfolios as a major cause of the recent
bank failures, suggesting that neither bank boards nor their audit committees
appropriately carried out their risk management responsibilities.
Given that most boards delegate risk management oversight to the audit
committee and given that the causes of the bank failures during the 2008–2011 timeframe
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are not unique and relate directly to the audit committee‘s responsibility for financial
reporting (e.g., determining the adequacy of the bank‘s provision for loan losses), the fact
that so many banks failed to account for the extreme levels of risk in their loan portfolios
suggests that audit committee members were lax in their duties, were not appropriately
qualified for their audit committee roles, or both. Following the logic of the experiencebased human capital theory, it is reasonable to assume that audit committee members
with banking experience or accounting expertise would be more qualified in meeting
their fiduciary risk oversight responsibilities. This reasoning leads to the following four
research hypotheses:
H8: Banks with directors on the audit committee possessing bank work
experience will be associated with a lower likelihood of failure.
H9: Banks with directors on the audit committee possessing bank director
experience will be associated with a lower likelihood of failure.
H10: Banks with directors on the audit committee possessing accounting expertise
will be associated with a lower likelihood of failure.
H11: Banks with directors on the audit committee possessing bank work
experience, bank director experience, and accounting expertise will be associated
with a relatively lower likelihood of failure than banks with directors on the audit
committee possessing only bank work experience, bank director experience, or
accounting expertise.
With respect to directors‘ tenure on the audit committee, the conflicting theories
discussed earlier in relation to board members are relevant with respect to audit
committee members. One can argue that industry- and bank-specific knowledge gained
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over years of service would translate into more-effective oversight at the audit committee
level. However, one could similarly argue that longer tenure causes directors to shirk
their duties as suggested by the management-friendliness perspective. Therefore, the final
three research hypotheses are stated in the null form:
H12: There is no association between the tenure of directors on a bank‘s audit
committee and the likelihood of bank failure.
H13: There is no association between the tenure of directors with bank work
experience on a bank‘s audit committee and the likelihood of bank failure.
H14: There is no association between the tenure of directors with accounting
expertise on a bank‘s audit committee and the likelihood of bank failure.

CHAPTER 3
METHODOLOGY
Determination of the Research Sample
The sample for this study includes all U.S. commercial banks that failed during
the period 2008–2011. The latest series of bank failures began in 2008. In fact, there were
no commercial bank failures in 2005 or 2006 and only three failures in 2007. However,
there were 19 commercial bank failures in 2008. The sample period ends in 2011 in order
to ensure that nonfailed matching banks did not subsequently fail shortly after the end of
the sample period.
The sample selection starts from all nationally chartered banks that are members
of the Federal Reserve and supervised by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
(OCC, 2013), all state-chartered Fed members supervised by the Federal Reserve, and all
state-chartered non-Fed member institutions supervised by the FDIC. A bank is
considered ―failed‖ if it is listed in the Failed Bank List maintained by the FDIC. Recall
that per the FDIC‘s website, a bank failure is deemed to have occurred when a bank is
closed by a federal or state banking regulatory agency and that a bank is generally closed
when it is unable to meet its obligations to depositors and others (http://www.fdic.gov/
consumers/ banking/facts/). From the beginning of 2008 through the end of 2011, the
Failed Bank List reflects a total of 413 failures. Included in the total are 59 thrift and
savings banks (50 FDIC-supervised state-chartered thrifts and OCC-supervised federally
chartered thrifts and 9 state-chartered FDIC-supervised savings banks) that were
40
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excluded to derive the commercial bank sample. (Thrift and savings banks operate under
charters that are different from those of commercial banks; the financial information of
thrift and savings banks is presently different from that of commercial banks; and thrift
and savings banks are operationally different from commercial banks in that they focus
exclusively on making home loans and offering savings accounts to customers. For these
reasons, thrifts and savings banks were excluded from the sample.) Of the remaining 354
failed commercial banks, 65 were public institutions and 289 were privately owned
institutions. The public banks are the focus of this study because the director-related
information for the private banks generally is not publicly available. In virtually all the
cases of bank failures during the sample period, the banks were part of a one-bank
holding company (BHC), and it was the BHC that was the public entity. Public banks and
bank holding companies are required to file Form DEF 14A (Definitive Proxy Statement)
documents with the SEC. Those proxy statements typically indicate the individuals who
are the directors of the BHC and the individuals who are directors of the operating banks.
Most of the biographical information on the directors was obtained from these annual
proxy statements.
In a total of 15 instances over the three-year study period, the 65 banks referred to
here as public institutions actually include banks that were not publicly owned but met
the reporting requirements of the SEC. Companies with at least $10 million in total assets
and whose securities are held by at least 500 owners generally must file disclosure reports
with the SEC. Although the public banks accounted for only about 22% of the total
commercial bank failures during the four-year period under review, the assets of those
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banks represented approximately 51% of the total assets of all failed banks, and $17
billion in lost market capitalization.
Consistent with previous bank failure literature (Espahbodi, 1991; Lane et al.,
1986; Meyer & Pifer, 1970), I employ a matched-pairs design because it helps control for
extraneous effects and is a more efficient design when the data have to be hand-collected.
I identify one matched nonfailed bank for each failed bank in the sample. For reasons
outlined below, matching was accomplished based on bank age, size (total assets), and
geographic markets. Additionally, the nonfailed bank in each matched-pair must not have
failed by September 30, 2012, as confirmed by the Failed Bank List on that date.
As is the case with most new business start-ups, new banks are often financially
fragile, and their asset portfolios are less diversified than those of more established banks,
leading to a greater variability in earnings. If a bank is able to reach financial maturity, its
risk of failure declines sharply (Cole & Curry, 2011; DeYoung, 2003). Thus, matched
nonfailed banks were selected first on the basis of bank age. Matching on the basis of
asset size was accomplished with as close a match between the failed and nonfailed banks
as possible; in all possible situations, banks were deemed to be of similar size if their
total assets were within ±30% in the year of failure. My review of previous bank failure
studies indicates that specific criteria for determining a size match between failed and
nonfailed banks are not always disclosed. In one instance, the total assets of a bank were
―not allowed to exceed twice those of its matching bank‖ (Lane et al., 1986). Finally,
matching on the basis of geographic markets allows for and helps to control for
differences in economic conditions in the prevailing markets.10

10

Four states—California, Florida, Georgia, and Illinois—accounted for 40 of the 65 banks that failed
between 2008 and 2011 that were registrants with the SEC at the time of their failure.
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Therefore, the sample for this study was 65 failed banks that were registrants with
the SEC at the time of their failure from 2008–2011 and 65 nonfailed matching banks.
Data were collected on 130 banks for one year before failure (Year 1). Due to missing
data on failed banks, the matched-pairs sample dropped to 128 total banks two years
before failure (Year 2) and to 116 total banks three years before failure (Year 3).
Variables
See Table 1 for a list of the test and control variables, their expected associations
with bank failure, their definitions, and the sources of the related data. The information
for all the variables was collected for the three-year period leading up to failure of the
failed banks; the same information was collected for the matched nonfailed banks for the
corresponding periods.

Table 1
Variable Definitions
Variable Name

Expected
Sign

Variable Description

Data Source

Dependent Variable
BANK_FAILURE

Indicator variable equal to 1 if bank has failed per
FDIC‘s List of Failed Banks; 0 otherwise

FDIC List of Failed Banks

Test Variables
BOD_BANKWORK_EXP_ONE

–

BOD_NONEX_BANKWORK_EXP_ONE

–

BOD_INDEP_BANKWORK_EXP_ONE

–

BOD_BANKDIR_EXP_ONE

–

BOD_NONEX_BANKDIR_EXP_ONE

–

BOD_INDEP_BANKDIR_EXP_ONE

–

BOD_SPECACCTG_ONE

–

Indicator variable equal to 1 if bank board has at
least one member who has commercial bank work
experience; 0 otherwise
Indicator variable equal to 1 if bank board has at
least one nonexecutive director who has commercial
bank work experience; 0 otherwise
Indicator variable equal to 1 if bank board has at
least one independent director who has commercial
bank work experience; 0 otherwise
Indicator variable equal to 1 if bank board has at
least one member who has commercial bank director
experience; 0 otherwise
Indicator variable equal to 1 if bank board has at
least one nonexecutive director who has commercial
bank director experience; 0 otherwise
Indicator variable equal to 1 if bank board has at
least one independent director who has commercial
bank director experience; 0 otherwise
Indicator variable equal to 1 if bank board has at
least one member who has specific accounting
experience as a CPA or in public accounting; 0
otherwise

Form DEF 14A

Form DEF 14A

Form DEF 14A

Form DEF 14A

Form DEF 14A

Form DEF 14A

Form DEF 14A

(continued)
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Table 1 (continued)
Variable Name

Expected
Sign

BOD_NONEX_SPECACCTG_ONE

–

BOD_INDEP_SPECACCTG_ONE

–

BOD_POTACCTG_ONE

–

BOD_NONEX_POTACCTG_ONE

–

BOD_INDEP_POTACCTG_ONE

–

AVGBODTEN_DIRECTORS_YRS

+/-

AVGBODTEN_NONEX_YRS

+/-

AVGBODTEN_INDEP_YRS

+/-

Variable Description

Data Source

Indicator variable equal to 1 if bank board has at
least one nonexecutive director who has specific
accounting experience as a CPA or in public
accounting; 0 otherwise
Indicator variable equal to 1 if bank board has at
least one independent director who has specific
accounting experience as a CPA or in public
accounting; 0 otherwise
Indicator variable equal to 1 if bank board has at
least one member who has work experience as a
chief financial officer, vice president of finance, or
controller; 0 otherwise
Indicator variable equal to 1 if bank board has at
least one nonexecutive director who has work
experience as a chief financial officer, vice president
of finance, or controller; 0 otherwise
Indicator variable equal to 1 if bank board has at
least one independent director who has work
experience as a chief financial officer, vice president
of finance, or controller; 0 otherwise
Sum of total board service for all members of the
board divided by the size of the board
Sum of total board service for all nonexecutive
directors divided by the total number of
nonexecutive directors on the board
Sum of total board service for all independent
directors divided by the total number of independent
directors on the board

Form DEF 14A

Form DEF 14A

Form DEF 14A

Form DEF 14A

Form DEF 14A

Form DEF 14A
Form DEF 14A

Form DEF 14A

(continued)
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Table 1 (continued)
Variable Name

Expected
Sign

AC_BANKWORK_EXP_ONE

–

AC_NONEX_BANKWORK_EXP_ONE

–

AC_BANKDIR_EXP_ONE

–

AC_NONEX_BANKDIR_EXP_ONE

–

AC_INDEP_BANKDIR_EXP_ONE

–

AC_SPECACCTG_ONE

–

AC_NONEX_SPECACCTG_ONE

–

AC_INDEP_SPECACCTG_ONE

–

Variable Description

Data Source

Indicator variable equal to 1 if bank‘s audit
committee has at least one member who has
commercial bank work experience; 0 otherwise
Indicator variable equal to 1 if bank‘s audit
committee has at least one nonexecutive director
who has commercial bank work experience; 0
otherwise
Indicator variable equal to 1 if bank‘s audit
committee has at least one member who has
commercial bank director experience; 0 otherwise
Indicator variable equal to 1 if bank‘s audit
committee has at least one nonexecutive director
who has commercial bank director experience; 0
otherwise
Indicator variable equal to 1 if bank‘s audit
committee has at least one independent director who
has commercial bank director experience; 0
otherwise
Indicator variable equal to 1 if bank‘s audit
committee has at least one member who has specific
accounting experience as a CPA or in public
accounting; 0 otherwise
Indicator variable equal to 1 if bank‘s audit
committee has at least one nonexecutive director
who has specific accounting experience as a CPA or
in public accounting; 0 otherwise
Indicator variable equal to 1 if bank‘s audit
committee has at least one independent director who
has specific accounting experience as a CPA or in
public accounting; 0 otherwise

Form DEF 14A

Form DEF 14A

Form DEF 14A

Form DEF 14A

Form DEF 14A

Form DEF 14A

Form DEF 14A

Form DEF 14A
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(continued)

Table 1 (continued)
Variable Name

Expected
Sign

AC_POTACCTG_ONE

–

AC_NONEX_POTACCTG_ONE

–

AC_INDEP_POTACCTG_ONE

–

ACAVGBODTEN_ACDIRECTORS_YRS

+/-

ACAVGBODTEN_ACINDEPDIR_YRS

+/-

Variable Description

Data Source

Indicator variable equal to 1 if bank‘s audit
committee has at least one member who has work
experience as a chief financial officer, vice president
of finance, or controller; 0 otherwise
Indicator variable equal to 1 if bank‘s audit
committee has at least one nonexecutive director
who has work experience as a chief financial officer,
vice president of finance, or controller; 0 otherwise
Indicator variable equal to 1 if bank board has at
least one member who has commercial bank work
experience; 0 otherwise
Sum of total board service for all members of the
audit committee divided by the size of the audit
committee
Sum of total board service for all independent
directors on the audit committee divided by the total
number of independent directors on the audit
committee

Form DEF 14A

The natural log of the size of the board of directors
Proportion of the board members who are
independent
Indicator variable equal to 1 if the CEO of the bank
is also the board chairman; 0 otherwise
The natural log of the number of board meetings
annually
The natural log of the size of the audit committee
Ratio of total equity to total assets

Form DEF 14A
Form DEF 14A

Form DEF 14A

Form DEF 14A

Form DEF 14A

Form DEF 14A

Control Variables
BODSIZE
BODIND

+/+/-

DUALITY

+/-

BODMEET

–

ACSIZE
EQUITY

+/–

Form DEF 14A
Form DEF 14A
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Form DEF 14A
Federal Financial Institutions
Examination Council website:
https://cdr.ffiec.gov/public/
(continued)

Table 1 (continued)
Variable Name

Expected
Sign

Variable Description

ADJNPA

+

Ratio of loans past due 90+ days + nonaccruing
loans + OREO to total assets

C&I

+

Ratio of commercial and industrial loans to total
assets

ROA

–

Ratio of net income to total assets

LOANS

+

Ratio of total loans (net) to total assets

NONAC_BANKWORK_EXP_ONE

–

NONAC_BANKDIR_EXP_ONE

–

NONAC_SPECACCTG_ONE

–

NONAC_POTACCTG_ONE

–

Indicator variable equal to 1 if the bank‘s non–audit
committee members have at least one director with
commercial bank work experience; 0 otherwise
Indicator variable equal to 1 if the bank‘s non–audit
committee members have at least one director with
commercial bank director experience; 0 otherwise
Indicator variable equal to 1 if the bank‘s non–audit
committee members have at least one director with
specific accounting experience as a CPA or in public
accounting; 0 otherwise
Indicator variable equal to 1 if the bank‘s non–audit
committee members have at least one director with
work experience as a chief financial officer, vice
president of finance, or controller; 0 otherwise
The sum of board service for the non–audit
committee members of the board divided by the
number of non–audit committee members of the
board

NONAC_AVGBODTEN_NONAC_DIR

+/-

Data Source
Federal Financial Institutions
Examination Council website:
https://cdr.ffiec.gov/public/
Federal Financial Institutions
Examination Council website:
https://cdr.ffiec.gov/public/
Federal Financial Institutions
Examination Council website:
https://cdr.ffiec.gov/public/
Federal Financial Institutions
Examination Council website:
https://cdr.ffiec.gov/public/
Form DEF 14A

Form DEF 14A

Form DEF 14A

Form DEF 14A

Form DEF 14A
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(continued)

Table 1 (continued)
Variable Name

Expected
Sign

NONAC_AVGBODTEN_NONAC_NONEXDIR

+/-

NONAC_AVGBODTEN_NONAC_INDEPDIR

+/-

Variable Description
The sum of board service for the non–audit
committee nonexecutive directors of the board
divided by the number of non–audit committee
nonexecutive directors of the board
The sum of board service for the non–audit
committee independent directors of the board
divided by the number of non–audit committee
independent directors of the board

Data Source
Form DEF 14A

Form DEF 14A
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The dependent variable (bank failure) is dichotomous in nature and is based on
whether or not a bank is listed in the Failed Bank List maintained by the FDIC. Bank
failure is empirically measured as 1 for a bank in this list, and 0 otherwise. There are four
independent variables of interest in this study—commercial bank work experience, bank
director experience, accounting expertise, and director tenure—as each relates to both
the board of directors and the audit committee. Because the dependent variable is
dichotomous, I estimate a logistic regression for each of the three years prior to a bank‘s
failure, and the empirical model takes the following form, where Pr is the probability of
bank failure and the variables are defined below:
(1)

Pr(bank failure)t = f{commercial bank work experience + bank director
experience + accounting expertise + director tenure + control variables}t–1

(2)

Pr(bank failure)t = f{commercial bank work experience + bank director
experience + accounting expertise + director tenure + control variables}t–2

(3)

Pr(bank failure)t = f{commercial bank work experience + bank director
experience + accounting expertise + director tenure + control variables}t–3

Commercial bank work experience (BOD_BANKWORK_EXP_ONE) and
commercial bank director experience (BOD_BANKDIR_EXP_ONE) are represented as
dummy variables, with 1 indicating the presence of at least one member of the board of
directors with that type of experience and 0 indicating the absence of such experience.
This information is assessed based on director biographies in each bank‘s (or bank
holding company‘s) Form DEF 14A as filed with the SEC in the respective years. A
director is deemed to have commercial bank work experience or commercial bank
director experience (either previous or contemporaneous experience with respect to
director service) if the director‘s biography includes a reference to previous work or
director experience in commercial banking. In instances in which a director‘s bio
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included a reference to a specific financial institution, every effort was made to verify
that the institution in question is or was a commercial bank and not a savings bank, a
cooperative bank, a credit union, an investment bank, or an industrial bank, because the
operational characteristics of these types of financial institutions differ considerably from
those of commercial banks. Given that work experience in the commercial banking
industry—either as an employee or as a director—should provide a director with a
heightened awareness of the types of activities that most often lead to bank failures, I
expect a negative association between these variables and bank failure.
A number of studies reported in recent years highlight the fact that the type of
accounting expertise represented on a company‘s audit committee has implications for
market perceptions (DeFond et al., 2005), accounting conservatism (Krishnan &
Visvanathan, 2008), internal control quality (Krishnan, 2005), financial restatements
(Abbott et al., 2004), and accruals quality (Dhaliwal et al., 2010). Therefore, it is
reasonable to assume that the nature of the accounting expertise represented on a bank‘s
board may have implications for bank failure. Moreover, given the fact that the audit
committee is often accountable for the board‘s risk management responsibilities, the type
of accounting expertise represented on a bank‘s audit committee may prove to be
especially germane.
Naiker and Sharma (2009) investigate how internal control over financial
reporting quality is affected by the presence of former partners on the audit committee
who are affiliated or unaffiliated with the firm‘s external auditor and find that both
categories of former audit partners are negatively associated with the incidence of
internal control deficiencies. Consistent with Naiker and Sharma, I measure accounting
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expertise as board members possessing or having possessed a certified public accountant
designation or public accounting experience (BOD_SPECACCTG_ ONE). I also employ
an alternative definition of accounting expertise, per Naiker and Sharma, as follows:
board members with work experience as a chief financial officer, vice president of
finance, or controller (BOD_POTACCTG_ONE). As with the bank work experience and
director experience variables, each of the accounting expertise variables will be
empirically measured as 1 if the board has at least one director with that level of
expertise, and 0 otherwise. In light of the professional knowledge and specialized
expertise associated with each of the representations of accounting expertise, I would
expect each to be negatively associated with bank failure. Following Sharma and Iselin
(2012), director tenure will be defined as the average tenure of all board members
(AVGBODTEN_DIR_YRS). Due to the conflicting theories associated with board tenure
discussed earlier, I make no prediction for the association between board tenure and bank
failure.
Given that several of my hypotheses address the audit committee members as a
result of their risk management responsibilities, each of the test variables associated with
the board of directors—BANKWORK_EXP_ONE, BANKDIR_EXP_ONE,
SPECACCTG_ONE, POTACCTG_ONE, AVGBODTEN_DIR_YRS—will also be
investigated in relation to the members of the audit committee, as listed in Table 1. Note
that the audit committee–level variables are simply preceded by ―AC‖ to denote that they
relate to audit committee members, as opposed to the BOD that denotes board-level
variables. In each case, the predicted associations between the audit committee–level
variables and bank failure are the same as the predicted associations between the
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corresponding board-level variables and bank failure. Since the tenure of members of the
audit committee was rarely disclosed, the audit committee tenure variable is based on the
directors‘ tenure on the board instead.
Note also that each hypothesis is tested across three categories of directors: all
directors, nonexecutive directors (those directors who are not executives of the bank in
question), and independent directors (those directors who are not executives of the bank
in question and who do not have business dealings with the bank sufficient to raise
questions of independence with respect to the bank). Gray directors, those directors who
are also nonexecutives of the bank but who have business relationships with the bank
sufficient to prevent them from being considered independent, were excluded from
consideration due to the fact that there were too few gray directors to perform analyses on
this group of directors.
In order to avoid confounding effects, I control for common board variables
employed in previous studies on boards and firm performance, as listed and defined in
Table 1 along with their expected directional associations. Note that in several cases I do
not form any expectation about a variable‘s expected association with bank failure due to
the inconsistent and inconclusive findings of previous research. I control for size of the
board of directors (BODSIZE), the number of board meetings annually (BODMEET),
CEO duality (DUALITY), and board independence11 (BODIND)—defined as the
proportion of all board members who are independent. For both BODSIZE and
BODMEET, I use the natural log to normalize the data. I expect a negative association
11

Independent directors are those whose only relationship with the firm involves their directorship.
Independent directors are not current or former employees of the firm or members of their immediate
families. Moreover, independent directors must not have any material relationship with the firm arising
from their roles as investment bankers, commercial bankers, lawyers, consultants, or officers and directors
of the firm‘s suppliers and customers.
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between the number of board meetings per year and bank failure (Vafeas, 1999).
However, I do not form any expectations with respect to the relationship among the size
of the board, board independence, and duality, and bank failure as a result of conflicting
empirical findings of prior studies.
In addition, when testing audit committee–related variables, I also control for the
size of the audit committee (ACSIZE)12 and form no expectation for the association
between audit committee size and bank failure, again due to conflicting results in the
literature.13
When testing the audit committee–related variables for bank work experience,
director experience, accounting expertise, and tenure, I control for the possibility of
board-level variables for each of those test variables influencing the results. Specifically,
when testing AC_BANKWORK_EXP_ONE, I control for potential effects of bank work
experience being represented among non-AC board members (NONAC_BANKWORK_
EXP_ONE). When testing AC_BANKDIR_EXP_ONE, I control for the possibility that
bank director experience among non-AC board members (NONAC_BANKDIR_EXP_
ONE) may affect my results, and so on.
Next, I control for a number of variables with directional predictions that have
been shown in previous banking literature to be statistically significant in predicting bank
failure. The Uniform Financial Rating System, informally known as the CAMELS ratings
system, has been used by federal banking regulators for more than three decades as a
means of assessing the health of individual banks. CAMELS is an acronym that

12

The number of audit committee meetings was not used as a control due to missing data in too many cases.
One requirement of SOX is that insiders are no longer allowed to serve on the audit committee. Thus, the
percentage of insiders serving on the audit committee who are independent of the CEO will not be
examined.
13
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represents Capital adequacy, Asset quality, Management, Earnings, Liquidity, and
Sensitivity to market risks (Cole & Curry, 2011). Although I collected data on a total of
26 financial ratios used in prior bank failure research, in order to have my models be as
parsimonious as possible, I chose five CAMELS-focused ratios that have consistently
been reported to be statistically significant (p < 0.05) in predicting bank failure in
previous studies (see Antoniades, 2013; Avery & Hanweck, 1984; Berger, Imbierowicz,
& Rauch, 2012; Cole & Curry, 2011; Cole & Gunther, 1995, 1998; Cole & White, 2012;
DeYoung, 2003; Kerstein & Kozberg, 2013; Lane et al., 1986; Martin, 1977; Mayes &
Stremmel, 2013; Nuxoll, 2003; Short, O‘Driscoll, & Berger, 1985; Sinkey, 1975;
Thomson, 1991; West, 1985; Whalen, 1991; Wheelock & Wilson, 1995, 2000).
Representing the capital adequacy dimension, I control for the ratio of total equity to total
assets (EQUITYASSETS). Since this ratio is a measure of the adequacy of a bank‘s
capital base, I expect a negative association between this measure and bank failure. Asset
quality is measured by two ratios that have been shown in previous studies to be
positively associated with bank failure. Specifically, I control for the ratio of adjusted
nonperforming assets to total assets (ADJNPA). Adjusted nonperforming assets include
loans past due 90+ days plus nonaccruing loans plus other real estate owned, which the
OCC (2013) defines as real estate acquired through any means in full or partial
satisfaction of a debt previously contracted; as a result, I expect it to be positively
associated with bank failure. Because losses related to loans to commercial and industrial
businesses have often been associated with bank failures (Cole & White, 2012), I also
control for commercial and industrial loans as a percentage of total assets (C&I) and
expect a positive association between this measure and bank failure. Earnings is
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represented by the bank‘s return on assets (ROA), and I expect this measure to be
negatively associated with bank failure. Liquidity is assessed via one ratio: the ratio of
total loans to total assets (LOANS). I expect this variable to be positively related to bank
failure.
Note that I have excluded the management and sensitivity to market risks
dimensions included in the CAMELS system. According to the FDIC‘s Risk Management
Manual of Examination Policies, the management dimension involves a qualitative
assessment of the
capability of the board of directors and management, in their respective
roles, to identify, measure, monitor, and control the risks of an
institution‘s activities and to ensure a financial institution‘s safe, sound,
and efficient operation in compliance with applicable laws and
regulations. (FDIC, n.d., p. 4.1-14)
Similarly, the sensitivity to market risks dimension includes a qualitative assessment of
―the degree to which changes in interest rates, foreign exchange rates, commodity prices,
or equity prices can adversely affect a financial institution‘s earnings or economic
capital‖ (p. 7.1-15). Since both the management and sensitivity to market risks
components are qualitative assessments made by the bank examiner during the course of
a bank examination, and these data are not publicly available, they are excluded from the
study.
The financial information necessary to calculate the CAEL elements and other
control variables will be taken from the banks‘ Reports of Income and Condition
(generally referred to as ―call reports‖) as filed with regulatory bodies. That information
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is publicly available at the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council website
(https://cdr.ffiec.gov/public/).
Data Analysis
Given that bank failure is a nonmetric, dichotomous (binary) dependent variable, I
employ logistic regression analysis to test the study‘s hypotheses. Both logistic regression
and discriminant analysis are appropriate statistical techniques when the dependent
variable is categorical and the independent variables are either metric (normally the case
for discriminant analysis) or nonmetric (Hair et al., 2010). However, there are instances
in which logistic regression is considered superior to discriminant analysis. For instance,
two key assumptions underlying discriminant analysis are multivariate normality of the
independent variables and equal dispersion and covariance structures for the groups
defined by the dependent variable. These assumptions are not always met. While logistic
regression is identical to discriminant analysis in terms of the research objectives it can
address, logistic regression is not predicated on the multivariate normality or equal
variance assumptions and ―is much more robust when these assumptions are not met,
making its application appropriate in many situations‖ (Hair et al., 2010, p. 319).
In addition to not requiring the conditions upon which discriminant analysis is
based, many researchers prefer logistic regression over discriminant analysis due to its
similarities with multiple regression. According to Hair et al. (2010, p. 343), those
similarities include ―straightforward statistical tests, similar approaches to incorporating
metric and nonmetric variables and nonlinear effects, and a wide range of diagnostics.‖

CHAPTER 4
DATA ANALYSIS AND RESULTS
Descriptive Statistics
The sample for this study was 65 failed banks that were registrants with the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) at the time of their failure from 2008–2011
and 65 nonfailed matching banks. Therefore, data were collected on 130 banks for one
year before failure (Year 1), but due to missing data on failed banks the sample dropped
to 128 banks in Year 2, and to 116 banks in Year 3. Frequencies and percentages for bank
board characteristics by year are presented in Table 2. Approximately 38% of the banks
in all three years had at least one director with bank work experience (BOD_
BANKWORK_ EXP _ONE), 33% had at least one director with bank director experience
(BOD_ BANKDIR_ EXP_ONE), 44% had at least one director with special accounting
experience (BOD_SPECACCTG_ONE), and 17% had at least one director with potential
accounting experience (BOD_POTACCTG_ONE). Approximately, 26% of the banks in
all three years had at least one nonexecutive director with bank work experience
(BOD_NONEX_BANKWORK_EXP_ONE), 31% had at least one nonexecutive director
with bank director experience (BOD_NONEX_BANKDIR_EXP_ONE), 44% had at
least one nonexecutive director with special accounting experience (BOD_NONEX_
SPECACCTG_ONE), and 15% had at least one nonexecutive director with potential
accounting experience (BOD_NONEX_POTACCTG_ONE). Finally, 25% of banks had
at least one independent director with bank work experience (BOD_INDEP_
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BANKWORK_EXP_ONE), 31% had at least one independent director with bank
director experience (BOD_INDEP_BANKDIR_EXP_ONE), 42% had at least one
independent director with special accounting experience (BOD_INDEP_ SPECACCTG_
ONE), and 15% of the banks had at least one independent director with potential
accounting experience (BOD_INDEP_POTACCTG_ONE).

Table 2
Frequencies and Percentages for Bank Board Characteristics
Year 1
Year 2
Year 3
Total
(n = 130) (n = 128) (n = 116) (n = 374)
Characteristic
n
%
n
%
n
%
n
%
BOD_BANKWORK_EXP_ONE
49 38 50 39 44 38 143 38
BOD_NONEX_BANKWORK_EXP_ONE 36 28 32 25 28 24 96 26
BOD_INDEP_BANKWORK_EXP_ONE
34 26 31 24 27 23 92 25
BOD_BANKDIR_EXP_ONE
44 34 42 33 39 34 125 33
BOD_NONEX_BANKDIR_EXP_ONE
40 31 39 31 36 31 115 31
BOD_INDEP_BANKDIR_EXP_ONE
40 31 39 31 35 30 114 31
BOD_SPECACCTG_ONE
60 46 57 45 49 42 166 44
BOD_NONEX_SPECACCTG_ONE
60 46 57 45 49 42 166 44
BOD_INDEP_SPECACCTG_ONE
57 44 54 42 47 41 158 42
BOD_POTACCTG_ONE
25 19 22 17 17 15 64 17
BOD_NONEX_POTACCTG_ONE
21 16 20 16 16 14 57 15
BOD_INDEP_POTACCTG_ONE
21 16 20 16 16 14 57 15

Chi-square tests were conducted to assess differences in the percentages of bank
board characteristics by failure status. Table 3 presents the percentages of bank board
characteristics by failure status. Significance was found for BOD_BANKWORK_
EXP_ONE for Year 1, as well as for both BOD_NONEX_BANKWORK_EXP_ONE
and BOD_INDEP_BANKWORK_EXP_ONE for Years 1–3 (p < .05 for all tests).
Results showed that a higher percentage of failed banks had directors with bank work
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experience in Year 1. Additionally, there were higher percentages of failed banks with
nonexecutive and independent directors with bank work experience in all three years.
Data were also collected on directors serving on banks‘ audit committees.
Frequencies and percentages for bank audit committee characteristics are presented in
Table 4. Approximately 14% of banks had at least one audit committee director with
bank work experience (AC_BANKWORK_EXP_ONE), 22% had at least one audit
committee director with bank director experience (AC_BANKDIR_EXP_ONE), 36%
had at least one audit committee director with special accounting experience
(AC_SPEACCTG_ONE), and 13% had at least one audit committee director with
potential accounting experience (AC_POTACCTG_ONE). These percentages declined
slightly for nonexecutive directors as follows: 13% of banks had at least one
nonexecutive director on the audit committee with bank work experience (AC_NONEX_
BANKWORK _EXP_ONE), 21% had at least one nonexecutive director on the audit
committee with bank director experience (AC_NONEX_BANKWORK_EXP_ONE),
36% had at least one nonexecutive director on the audit committee with special
accounting experience (AC_NONEX_SPECACCTG_ONE), and 12% had at least one
nonexecutive director on the audit committee with potential accounting experience
(AC_NONEX_POTACCTG_ONE). The same pattern continued with independent audit
committee members as follows: 13% of the banks had at least one independent audit
committee director with bank work experience (AC_INDEP_ BANKWORK_EXP_
ONE), 21% had at least one independent audit committee member with bank director
experience (AC_INDEP_BANKDIR_EXP_ONE), 35% had at least one independent
audit committee member with special accounting experience (AC_INDEP_
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SPECACCTG_ONE), and 12% had at least one independent director on the audit
committee with potential accounting experience (AC_INDEP_ POTACCTG_ ONE).
Chi-square tests were also conducted to assess significant differences in bank
audit committee characteristics by failure status. Table 5 presents the percentages
separated by bank failure status. Significant differences in the chi-squares were found
only for AC_BANKWORK_EXP_ONE in Years 1–3 (p < .05 for all). Percentages
showed that a significantly higher percentage of failed banks had at least one audit
committee director with bank work experience.
Data were also collected on the tenure of all directors, nonexecutive directors, and
independent directors both at the board level and also on the audit committee. Means and
standard deviations for board and audit committee tenure are presented in Table 6. At the
board level, tenure was at its lowest for independent directors in Year 3 (M = 9.56, SD =
4.61), while it was at its highest for nonexecutive directors in Year 1 (M = 10.73, SD =
4.65). For the audit committee, tenure was at its lowest for all directors in Year 3 (M =
8.83, SD = 4.87), while it was at its highest for independent directors in Year 1 (M =
9.67, SD = 4.94). Table 6 presents descriptive statistics for the control variables.

Table 3
Percentages for Bank Board Characteristics by Bank Failure Status

Characteristic
BOD_BANKWORK_EXP_ONE

Year 1
(n = 130)
Not
Failed
failed
(%)
(%)
29
46

Year 2
(n = 128)
Not
Failed
failed
(%)
(%)
31
47

Year 3
(n = 116)
Not
Failed
failed
(%)
(%)
29
47

Total
(n = 374)
Not
Failed
failed
(%)
(%)
30
47

BOD_NONEX_BANKWORK_EXP_ONE

17

39

16

34

14

35

16

36

BOD_INDEP_BANKWORK_EXP_ONE

14

39

14

34

12

35

13

36

BOD_BANKDIR_EXP_ONE

31

37

31

34

33

35

32

35

BOD_NONEX_BANKDIR_EXP_ONE

29

32

30

31

31

31

30

32

BOD_INDEP_BANKDIR_EXP_ONE

29

32

30

31

29

31

29

32

BOD_SPECACCTG_ONE

43

49

44

45

41

43

43

46

BOD_NONEX_SPECACCTG_ONE

43

49

44

45

41

43

43

46

BOD_INDEP_SPECACCTG_ONE

42

46

42

42

40

41

41

43

BOD_POTACCTG_ONE

22

17

20

14

16

14

19

15

BOD_NONEX_POTACCTG_ONE

19

14

17

14

12

16

16

14

BOD_INDEP_POTACCTG_ONE

19

14

17

14

12

16

16

14

Percentages in bold are significantly different at p < .05 using a chi-square test.
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Table 4
Frequencies and Percentages for Bank Audit Committee Characteristics

Characteristic
AC_BANKWORK_EXP_ONE

Year 1
(n = 130)
n
%
17 13

Year 2
(n = 128)
n
%
19 15

Year 3
(n = 116)
n
%
15 13

Total
(n = 374)
n
%
51 14

AC_NONEX_BANKWORK_EXP_ONE

16

12

18

14

15

13

49 13

AC_INDEP_BANKWORK_EXP_ONE

16

12

18

14

15

13

49 13

AC_BANKDIR_EXP_ONE

28

22

29

23

25

22

82 22

AC_NONEX_BANKDIR_EXP_ONE

27

21

26

20

24

21

77 21

AC_INDEP_BANKDIR_EXP_ONE

27

21

26

20

24

21

77 21

AC_SPECACCTG_ONE

48

37

47

37

39

34

134 36

AC_NONEX_SPECACCTG_ONE

48

37

47

37

39

34

134 36

AC_INDEP_SPECACCTG_ONE

47

36

46

36

37

32

130 35

AC_POTACCTG_ONE

17

13

17

13

13

11

47 13

AC_NONEX_POTACCTG_ONE

16

12

16

13

13

11

45 12

AC_INDEP_POTACCTG_ONE

16

12

16

13

13

11

45 12

Table 5
Percentages for Bank Audit Committee Characteristics by Bank Failure Status

Characteristic
AC_BANKWORK_EXP_ONE

Year 1
(n = 130)
Not
Failed
Failed
(%)
(%)
5
22

Year 2
(n = 128)
Not
Failed
Failed
(%)
(%)
5
25

Year 3
(n = 116)
Not
Failed
Failed
(%)
(%)
5
21

Total
(n = 374)
Not
Failed
Failed
(%)
(%)
5
23

AC_NONEX_BANKWORK_EXP_ONE

5

20

5

23

5

21

5

21

AC_INDEP_BANKWORK_EXP_ONE

5

20

5

23

5

21

5

21

AC_BANKDIR_EXP_ONE

20

23

20

25

19

24

20

24

AC_NONEX_BANKDIR_EXP_ONE

20

22

20

20

19

22

20

21

AC_INDEP_BANKDIR_EXP_ONE

20

22

20

20

19

22

20

21

AC_SPECACCTG_ONE

35

39

36

38

33

35

35

37

AC_NONEX_SPECACCTG_ONE

35

39

36

38

33

35

35

37

AC_INDEP_SPECACCTG_ONE

35

37

36

36

33

31

35

35

AC_POTACCTG_ONE

17

9

16

11

14

9

16

10

AC_NONEX_POTACCTG_ONE

17

8

16

9

14

9

16

9

AC_INDEP_POTACCTG_ONE

17

8

16

9

14

9

16

9

Percentages in bold are significantly different between bank failure status at p < .05 using a chi-square test.
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Table 6
Descriptive Statistics for Control Variables Used in Models

Control variable
EQUITY

Year 1
(n = 130)
M
SD
0.08
0.03

Year 2
(n = 128)
M
SD
0.10
0.02

Year 3
(n = 116)
M
SD
0.10
0.03

Total
(n = 374)
M
SD
0.09
0.03

ADJNPA

0.05

0.05

0.02

0.03

0.01

0.02

0.03

0.04

C&I

0.10

0.07

0.10

0.07

0.11

0.09

0.10

0.08

ROA

–0.01

0.03

0.01

0.01

0.01

0.01

0.00

0.02

LOANS

0.78

0.73

0.75

0.10

0.74

0.11

0.76

0.44

BODSIZE.log

2.29

0.28

2.31

0.27

2.31

0.27

2.30

0.27

BODIND

0.76

0.16

0.79

0.13

0.79

0.12

0.78

0.14

DUALITY

0.27

0.45

0.29

0.46

0.30

0.46

0.29

0.45

BODMEET.log

2.34

0.78

2.38

0.55

2.31

0.61

2.35

0.66

ACSIZE

3.90

1.39

4.10

1.13

3.93

1.28

3.98

1.27
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Tables 7 and 8 examine differences in board and audit committee tenure as well
as control variables used in the model by bank failure status. Significant differences were
found in the average board tenure for Years 1 and 2 (p < .05), suggesting that banks with
directors with longer average tenure were less likely to fail than banks with directors with
shorter average tenure in those years. Similarly, significance was also found for
nonexecutive directors‘ tenure for Years 1 and 2, with the average tenure of these
directors being significantly higher for those that were in nonfailed banks. Significance
was found for independent directors only in Year 1.
The test variables and control variables were examined for multicollinearity using
Spearman correlations because the variables are continuous and categorical. The matrix
was examined for all three years combined. Correlations with coefficients larger than .80
suggest the presence of multicollinearity (Gujarati, 2003). When examining the
correlation matrix, the only correlations that were above the .80 mark were between test
variables that would never appear in the same model. No correlation coefficients existed
between the control variables and the test variables that were above .80, nor were there
correlation coefficients above .80 among the control variables. Results of the correlations
are presented in Table 9.

Table 7
Means for Board and Audit Committee Tenure by Bank Failure Status

AVGBODTEN_DIRECTORS_YRS

Year 1
(n = 130)
Not
Failed
failed
(M)
(M)
11.69
9.65

Year 2
(n = 128)
Not
Failed
failed
(M)
(M)
10.82
9.22

Year 3
(n = 116)
Not
Failed
failed
(M)
(M)
10.36
8.99

Total
(n = 374)
Not
Failed
failed
(M)
(M)
10.98
9.30

AVGBODTEN_NONEX_YRS

11.69

9.74

10.79

9.11

10.35

8.79

10.97

9.23

AVGBODTEN_INDEP_YRS

11.56

9.86

10.69

9.18

10.26

8.84

10.86

9.31

9.63

9.09

9.87

8.89

9.34

8.32

9.62

8.78

ACAVGBODTEN_ACNONEXDIR_YRS

10.03

9.29

9.96

9.00

9.64

8.36

9.85

8.90

ACAVGBODTEN_ACINDEPDIR_YRS

10.04

9.31

9.96

9.02

9.64

8.37

9.86

8.92

Characteristic

ACAVGBODTEN_AC_DIRECTORS_YRS

Means in bold are significantly different between bank failure status at p < .05 using an independent sample t-test.
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Table 8
Means for Control Variables Used in Models by Bank Failure Status

Control
Variable
EQUITY

Year 1
(n = 130)
Not failed
Failed
(M)
(M)
0.10
0.07

Year 2
(n = 128)
Not failed
Failed
(M)
(M)
0.10
0.10

Year 3
(n = 116)
Not failed
Failed
(M)
(M)
0.10
0.10

Total
(n = 374)
Not failed
Failed
(M)
(M)
0.10
0.09

ADJNPA

0.02

0.07

0.01

0.03

0.01

0.01

0.01

0.04

C&I

0.11

0.10

0.10

0.11

0.10

0.11

0.10

0.10

ROA

0.00

–0.02

0.01

0.00

0.01

0.01

0.01

–0.01

LOANS

0.70

0.87

0.72

0.79

0.71

0.78

0.71

0.81

BODSIZE.log

2.34

2.25

2.35

2.26

2.35

2.27

2.35

2.26

BODIND

0.75

0.77

0.80

0.79

0.80

0.79

0.78

0.78

DUALITY*

0.20

0.34

0.20

0.38

0.21

0.40

0.20

0.37

BODMEET.log

2.13

2.56

2.29

2.47

2.24

2.38

2.22

2.47

ACSIZE

3.97

3.83

4.30

3.91

3.95

3.91

4.07

3.88

Means in bold are significantly different between bank failure status at p < .05 using paired sample t-test.
*Duality had a chi-square test conducted as it is a dichotomous variable.
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Table 9
Correlation Matrix for Test and Control Variables
1
–

2

EQUITY (1)
ADJNPA (2)

–.33

–

C&I (3)

.14

–.04

–

ROA (4)

.39

–.62

.04

–

LOANS (5)

.03

–.07

.20

.07

–

BODSIZE.log (6)

.06

–.02

.12

–.03

–.09

–

BODIND (7)

.00

–.04

.07

.02

.05

.21

–

DUALITY (8)

–.09

.12

–.02

–.07

–.03

–.22

–.20

–

BODMEET.log (9)

–.13

.19

–.01

–.13

.05

–.06

–.02

–.18

–

AC_BANKWORK_EXP_ONE (10)

.03

.15

–.03

–.14

.00

.04

–.16

.13

–.01

–

AC_NONEX_BANKWORK_EXP_ONE (11)

.03

.14

–.05

–.14

–.02

.04

–.16

.12

.00

.98

–

AC_INDEP_BANKWORK_EXP_ONE (12)

.03

.14

–.05

–.14

–.02

.00

–.16

.12

.00

.98

1.00

–

AC_BANKDIR_EXP_ONE (13)

.10

.00

–.15

.04

.03

.01

–.01

–.02

.01

.07

.01

.01

–

AC_NONEX_BANKDIR_EXP_ONE (14)

–.01

.01

.02

.08

.02

–.03

–.05

.01

.25

.07

.01

.01

.09

AC_INDEP_BANKDIR_EXP_ONE (15)

–.01

.01

.02

.08

.02

–.03

–.05

.01

.25

.07

–.04

–.04

.09

.06

.02

.14

–.04

.03

.20

.05

.02

.05

.06

.05

AC_SPECACCTG_ONE (16)
Coefficients significant at the 5% level are in bold.

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

.05 .02
(continued)
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Table 9 (continued)

AC_NONEX_SPECACCTG_ONE (17)

1
.06

2
.02

3
.14

4
–.04

5
.03

6
.20

7
.05

8
.02

9
.05

10
.06

11
.06

12
.06

13
.02

AC_INDEP_SPECACCTG_ONE (18)

.07

.01

.12

–.02

.02

.20

.08

.03

.04

.07

.06

.06

.01

AC_POTACCTG_ONE (19)

–.02

.04

.07

.02

–.03

–.04

.07

–.04

.04

.04

.07

.07

.07

AC_NONEXEC_POTACCTG_ONE (20)

–.02

.03

.05

.01

–.04

–.06

.08

–.03

.03

.04

.04

.04

.04

AC_INDEP_POTACCTG_ONE (21)

–.02

.03

.05

.01

–.04

–.06

.08

–.03

.03

.04

.05

.05

.04

AVGBODTEN_DIRECTORS_YRS (22)

–.01

.13

–.14

.15

–.14

–.11

–.08

.04

.04

–.18

.05

.05

–.21

AVGBODTEN_NONEX_YRS (23)

–.05

.13

–.09

.12

–.06

–.05

–.05

.02

.12

–.17

–.16

–.16

–.19

AVGBODTEN_INDEP_YRS (24)

–.08

.14

–.09

.11

–.05

–.06

–.08

.03

.13

–.16

–.15

–.15

–.19

ACAVGBODTEN_AC_DIRECTORS_YRS (25)

–.05

.11

–.08

.11

–.06

.01

–.03

.06

.11

–.11

–.14

–.14

–.18

ACAVGBODTEN_ACNONEXDIR_YRS (26)

–.05

.10

–.07

.11

–.05

.00

–.05

.05

.10

–.12

–.09

–.09

–.19

ACAVGBODTEN_ACINDEPDIR_YRS (27)

–.05

.10

–.07

.11

–.05

.00

–.06

.05

.11

–.12

–.11

–.11

–.19

Coefficients significant at the 5% level are in bold.
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Table 9 (continued)
14
1.00

15
–

16

AC_SPECACCTG_ONE (16)

.01

.01

–

AC_NONEX_SPECACCTG_ONE (17)

.01

.01

1.00

AC_INDEP_SPECACCTG_ONE (18)

–.01

–.01

.98

.98

–

AC_POTACCTG_ONE (19)

.05

.05

.02

.02

.03

–

AC_NONEXEC_POTACCTG_ONE (20)

.06

.06

.00

.00

.01

.98

–

AC_INDEP_POTACCTG_ONE (21)

.06

.06

.00

.00

.01

.98

1.00

AVGBODTEN_DIRECTORS_YRS (22)

–.21

–.21

–.13

–.13

–.11

.00

.01

.01

–

AVGBODTEN_NONEX_YRS (23)

–.19

–.19

–.11

–.11

–.09

.00

.01

.01

.94

–

AVGBODTEN_INDEP_YRS (24)

–.19

–.19

–.11

–.11

–.10

–.01

.01

.01

.93

.99

–

ACAVGBODTEN_AC_DIRECTORS_YRS (25)

–.18

–.18

–.07

–.07

–.06

–.01

.00

.00

.82

.84

.83

–

ACAVGBODTEN_ACNONEXDIR_YRS (26)

–.20

–.20

–.08

–.08

–.07

–.01

–.01

–.01

.84

.87

.87

.97

–

ACAVGBODTEN_ACINDEPDIR_YRS (27)

–.20

–.20

–.08

–.08

–.07

–.01

–.01

–.01

.84

.87

.87

.97

1.00

AC_INDEP_BANKDIR_EXP_ONE (15)

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

–

–

Coefficients significant at the 5% level are in bold.
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To examine Hypotheses 1–4, a series of binary logistic regressions were estimated
for each year to assess if bank work experience, bank director experience, the two levels
of accounting expertise of interest in this study, and the interactions of these variables
were significant in predicting bank failure. EQUITY, ADJNPA, C&I, ROA, LOANS,
(log) BODSIZE, BODIND, DUALITY, and (log) BODMEET were used as control
variables for the analyses. All omnibus chi-square tests of model coefficients ranged in
chi-square values from 32.16 to 107.71 and were significant at the p < .01 level. Cox &
Snell R2 values ranged from .24 to .56 among the models for Hypotheses 1–4, with 71–
88% of bank failures being correctly predicted by the models. Table 10 presents the
results from the logistic regressions for Hypotheses 1–4.
Control variables in the model were tested first with the test variables present.
Positive relationships with bank failure (at the p < .05 level) were found for ADJNPA
(Year 1) and LOANS (Years 1–3). Significant, negative relationships with bank failure
(at the p < .05 level) were found for EQUITY (Year 1) and ROA (Year 3). For brevity‘s
sake, the control variables were not tabulated in the full models with the test variables
present.

Table 10
Results for Logistic Regression Testing of Hypotheses 1–4
Year 1
Variable

Expected
Sign

B

Year 2
χ

2

Year 3

B

χ

2

B

χ2

H1
BOD_BANKWORK_EXP_ONE
BOD_NONEX_BANKWORK_EXP_ONE
BOD_INDEP_BANKWORK_EXP_ONE

–
–
–

1.28
1.78
0.60

4.73**
7.40***
0.96

0.63
0.88
0.13

1.80
2.90*
0.07

0.91
1.24
–0.17

3.34*
4.96**
0.12

BOD_BANKDIR_EXP_ONE
BOD_NONEX_BANKDIR_EXP_ONE
BOD_INDEP_BANKDIR_EXP_ONE

–
–
–

0.56
0.60
0.60

0.87
0.96
0.96

0.21
0.13
0.13

0.21
0.07
0.07

–0.06
–0.21
–0.17

0.02
0.19
0.12

BOD_SPECACCTG_ONE
–
0.52 0.91
BOD_NONEX_SPECACCTG_ONE
–
0.42 0.59
BOD_INDEP_SPECACCTG_ONE
–
0.45 0.66
BOD_POTACCTG_ONE
–
–0.63 0.71
BOD_NONEX_POTACCTG_ONE
–
–0.86 1.06
BOD_INDEP_POTACCTG_ONE
–
–0.87 1.08
*, **, and *** denote significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. Control variables are not shown.

–0.04
0.02
0.01
–0.60
–0.66
–0.66

0.01
0.00
0.00
1.00
1.02
1.02

–0.15
0.11
–0.08
0.03
0.01
0.00
–0.38
0.38
0.07
0.01
0.08
0.01
(continued)

H2

H3
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Table 10 (continued)
Year 1
Variable

Expected
Sign

B

Year 2

Year 3

2

B

χ

1.96

–1.37

1.84

0.39

0.15

1.14

–1.02

1.54

0.13

0.02

2.13

–1.32

2.59

–0.09

0.01

0.12

0.13

0.01

0.02

0.00

0.56

–0.12

0.01

–0.91

0.42

0.22

1.25

0.59

0.07

0.00

χ

2

B

χ2

H4
BOD_BANKWORK_EXP_ONE*BOD_BANKDIR_EXP_ONE*BOD_SPECACCTG_
ONE
–
–1.72
BOD_NONEX_BANKWORK_EXP_ONE*BOD_NONEX_BANKDIR_EXP
_ONE*BOD_NONEX_SPECACCTG_ONE
–
–1.24
BOD_INDEP_BANKWORK_EXP_ONE*BOD_INDEP_BANKDIR_EXP
_ONE*BOD_INDEP_ SPECACCTG_ONE
–
–1.63
BOD_BANKWORK_EXP_ONE*BOD_BANKDIR_EXP_ONE*BOD_POTACCTG
_ONE
–
–0.55
BOD_NONEX_BANKWORK_EXP_ONE*BOD_NONEX_BANKDIR_EXP
_ONE*BOD_NONEXEC_ POTACCTG_ONE
–
–1.45
BOD_INDEP_BANKWORK_EXP_ONE*BOD_INDEP_BANKDIR_EXP
_ONE*BOD_INDEP_ POTACCTG_ONE
–
–0.91
*, **, and *** denote significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. Control variables are not shown.
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Hypothesis 1 examined bank work experience in connection with bank failure.
Significance was found at the board level in Year 1 (B = 1.28, p < .050) and Year 3 (B =
0.91, p < .100), suggesting that banks having at least one director, regardless of whether
the director is an executive, nonexecutive, or independent, with previous bank work
experience were more likely to fail than banks without the presence of such directors on
their boards. Positive relationships were also found for nonexecutive directors with bank
work experience in Year 1 (B = 1.78, p < .010), Year 2 (B = 0.88, p < .10), and Year 3
(B = 1.24, p < .050), again suggesting that the presence of a nonexecutive director with
bank work experience on a bank‘s board was more likely to lead to bank failure than if
such directors were not present on the board. No results were significant for independent
directors. Although significance was found, given that the results indicated positive
relationships instead of negative ones, Hypothesis 1 was not supported.
Hypothesis 2 examined bank failure in the context of boards with bank director
experience. However, no significance was found for the relationship between bank
director experience and bank failure at the board level, for nonexecutive directors, or for
independent directors. However, the signs of the Betas were negative, as predicted, for all
three categories of directors in Year 3. Thus, Hypothesis 2 was not supported.
Hypothesis 3 examined the presence of the special accounting and potential
accounting experience variables and their relationships to bank failure. Again, no
significant relationships were found between special accounting experience and bank
failure or between potential accounting experience and bank failure. However, it is
interesting to note that the signs of the Betas were negative, as predicted, in three of nine
instances for special accounting experience and negative in seven of nine instances for
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potential accounting experience. Nevertheless, since no significant relationships were
found, Hypothesis 3 also was not supported.
Hypothesis 4 predicted that the interaction of bank work experience, bank director
experience, and special accounting experience or potential accounting experience would
be more significant in reducing the likelihood of bank failure than the presence of only
one of those variables. However, no significant results were found for the interactions,
and thus Hypothesis 4 was not supported. It is worth noting that the signs of the Betas
were negative, as predicted, in 12 of 18 cases.
To examine Hypotheses 5–7, a series of binary logistic regressions were estimated
for each year to assess if average tenure of the board members and the interactions among
average board tenure, bank work experience, and the two categories of accounting
expertise were related to bank failure. EQUITY, ADJNPA, C&I, ROA, LOANS, (log)
BODSIZE, BODIND, DUALITY, and (log) BODMEET were used as control variables
for the analyses. All omnibus chi-square tests of model coefficients ranged in chi-square
values from 33.38 to 105.44 and were significant at the p < .01 level. Cox & Snell R2
values ranged from .25 to .56 among the models for Hypotheses 5–7, with 72–90% of
bank failures being correctly predicted by the models. Results of the logistic regressions
for Hypotheses 5–7 are presented in Table 11.

Table 11
Results for Logistic Regression Testing of Hypotheses 5–7
Year 1

Expected
Sign

B

AVGBODTEN_DIRECTORS_YRS
AVGBODTEN_NONEX_YRS
AVGBODTEN_INDEP_YRS

+/–
+/–
+/–

AVGBODTEN_DIRECTORS_YRS*BOD_BANKWORK_EXP_ONE
AVGBODTEN_NONEX_YRS*BOD_NONEX_BANKWORK_EXP_ONE
AVGBODTEN_INDEP_YRS*BOD_INDEP_BANKWORK_EXP_ONE

+/–
+/–
+/–

Variable

Year 2
2

B

–0.17
–0.17
–0.16

6.15**
5.42**
5.20**

–0.44
–0.52
–0.54

5.78**
5.81**
5.33**

χ

Year 3
2

B

–0.12
–0.14
–0.14

4.61**
6.07**
6.08**

–0.06
–0.08
–0.08

1.20
2.46
2.40

–0.31
–0.23
–0.15

5.84**
2.77*
1.09

–0.29
–0.31
–0.29

4.73**
3.81*
2.66

0.00
0.01
–0.01
–0.38
–0.28
–0.29

0.00
0.01
0.01
2.23
1.55
1.60

0.06
0.07
0.03
–0.19
–0.15
–0.16

0.29
0.45
0.07
0.87
0.58
0.71

χ

χ2

H5

H6

H7
AVGBODTEN_DIRECTORS_YRS*BOD_SPECACCTG_ONE
+/–
0.02 0.02
AVGBODTEN_NONEX_YRS*BOD_NONEX_SPECACCTG_ONE
+/–
0.00 0.00
AVGBODTEN_INDEP_YRS*BOD_INDEP_SPECACCTG_ONE
+/–
–0.05 0.11
AVGBODTEN_DIRECTORS_YRS*BOD_POTACCTG_ONE
+/–
–0.41 1.66
AVGBODTEN_NONEX_YRS*BOD_NONEXEC_POTACCTG_ONE
+/–
–0.66 3.43*
AVGBODTEN_INDEP_YRS*BOD_INDEP_POTACCTG_ONE
+/–
–0.70 3.90**
*, **, and *** denote significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. Control variables are not shown.
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Control variables in the model were tested first without the test variables present.
Positive relationships with bank failure (at the p < .05 level) were found for ADJNPA
(Year 1) and LOANS (Years 1–3). Significant, negative relationships with bank failure
(at the p < .05 level) were found for EQUITY (Year 1) and ROA (Year 3). For brevity‘s
sake, the control variables were not tabulated in the full models with the test variables
present.
Hypothesis 5 examined the relationship between board tenure and bank failure
and predicted there would be no discernible relationship between tenure and failure.
Results showed significant, negative relationships between average tenure for the entire
board for Year 1 (B = –0.17, p < .05) and in Year 2 (B = –0.12, p < .05), suggesting that
as the average tenure of directors increased, the likelihood of bank failure tended to
decrease. Significant, negative relationships were also found for nonexecutive directors
for Year 1 (B = –0.17, p < .05) and Year 2 (B = –0.14, p < .05), as well as for independent
directors in Year 1 (B = –0.16, p < .10) and Year 2 (B = –0.14, p < .05). In short, these
results suggest that as board tenure increases, the likelihood of bank failure decreases.
Because there were significant associations found, the null form of Hypothesis 5 was
rejected.
Hypothesis 6 examined the interaction between director tenure and directors with
previous bank work experience and the likelihood of bank failure. Results showed
significant negative relationships at the total board level in Year 1 (B = –0.44, p < .05),
Year 2 (B = –0.31, p < .05), and Year 3 (B = –0.29, p < .05). This suggests that during all
three years, as the tenure of the directors with bank experience increased, the likelihood
for failure tended to decrease. Significant, negative relationships were also obtained for
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nonexecutive directors with bank work experience in Year 1 (B = –0.52, p < .05), Year 2
(B = –0.23, p < .10), and Year 3 (B = –0.31, p < .10). However, the interaction between
tenure of independent directors and bank work experience was negative in all three years
but was significant only in Year 1 (B = –0.54, p < .05). Because significant relationships
were found and Hypothesis 6 was stated in the null form, this hypothesis was rejected.
Hypothesis 7 examined the relationship between tenure of directors with
accounting expertise and bank failure. Significance was found only for nonexecutive and
independent directors with potential accounting experience and only in Year 1 (for
nonexecutive directors: B = –0.66, p < .10; for independent directors: B = –0.70, p < .05),
suggesting that as the tenure of nonexecutive and independent directors with potential
accounting experience increased, the likelihood for failure tended to decrease. Again,
because significant results were found, the null form of Hypothesis 7 was rejected.
To examine Hypotheses 8–11, a series of binary logistic regressions was
estimated for each year to assess whether the presence of banking experience, bank
director experience, and the two levels of accounting expertise on the audit committee, as
well as the interactions of these variables, was significantly related to bank failure.
EQUITY, ADJNPA, C&I, ROA, LOANS, (log) BODSIZE, BODIND, DUALITY, and
(log) BODMEET were used as control variables for the analyses. Additionally, ACSIZE,
NONAC_BANKWORK_EXP_ONE (H8), NONAC_BANKDIR_EXP_ONE (H9),
NONAC_SPECACCTG_ONE (H10), and NONAC_POTACCTG_ONE (H10) were
used as controls where appropriate. The NONAC variables for bank work experience,
bank director experience, special accounting expertise, and potential accounting expertise
were introduced as additional control variables for each of the audit committee–related
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hypotheses to control for the existence, if present, of each of these variables represented
at the board level. All omnibus chi-square tests of model coefficients ranged in chi-square
values from 32.20 to 103.10 and were significant at the p < .01 level. Cox & Snell R2
values ranged from .24 to .55 for the models for Hypotheses 8–11, with 71–89% of bank
failures being correctly predicted by the models. Results for Hypotheses 8–11 are
presented in Table 12.
Control variables in the model were tested first without the test variables present.
Positive relationships with bank failure (at the p < .05 level) were found for ADJNPA
(Year 1), LOANS (Years 1–3), duality (Years 1–3), and BOODMEET.log (Year 1). A
significant, negative relationship with bank failure (at the p < .05 level) was found for
EQUITY in Year 1.
Hypothesis 8 examined bank work experience for audit committee members and
the corresponding relationship with bank failure. Results showed significant positive
relationships for audit committee members with bank work experience in Year 1 (B =
3.93, p < .01), Year 2 (B = 1.57, p < .05), and Year 3 (B = 1.46, p < .10). These results
suggest that if a bank had an audit committee director with bank work experience, the
bank was more likely to fail than otherwise. Positive relationships were also found for
nonexecutive directors in Year 1 (B = 3.93, p < .01), Year 2 (B = 1.48, p < .10), and Year
3 (B = 1.46, p < .10), and also for independent directors in Year 1 (B = 3.93, p < .01),
Year 2 (B = 1.48, p < .10), and Year 3 (B = 1.46, p < .10). However, since the results
showed positive relationships, Hypothesis 8 was not supported.

Table 12
Results for Logistic Regression Testing of Hypotheses 8–11

Variable

Expected
Sign

Year 1
B

Year 2
χ

2

B

Year 3
χ

2

B

χ2

1.46
1.46
1.46

3.06*
3.06*
3.06*

H8
AC_BANKWORK_EXP_ONE
AC_NONEX_BANKWORK_EXP_ONE
AC_INDEP_BANKWORK_EXP_ONE

–
–
–

3.93
3.93
3.93

9.69***
9.69***
9.69***

1.57
1.48
1.48

4.31**
3.71*
3.71*

AC_BANKDIR_EXP_ONE
AC_NONEX_BANKDIR_EXP_ONE
AC_INDEP_BANKDIR_EXP_ONE

–
–
–

1.66
1.36
1.36

3.44*
2.53
2.53

0.61
0.04
0.04

0.82
0.00
0.00

0.13
–0.08
–0.08

0.05
0.02
0.02

AC_SPECACCTG_ONE
AC_NONEX_SPECACCTG_ONE
AC_INDEP_SPECACCTG_ONE
AC_POTACCTG_ONE
AC_NONEX_POTACCTG_ONE
AC_INDEP_POTACCTG_ONE

–
–
–
–
–
–

0.62
0.55
0.53
–1.77
–2.24
–2.25

0.62
0.64
0.66
3.74*
5.51**
5.12**

–0.07
–0.09
–0.16
–0.88
–1.23
–1.22

0.47
0.04
0.11
1.74
2.92*
2.90*

0.10
0.10
0.01
–0.71
–0.71
–0.70

0.04
0.04
0.00
0.84
0.84
0.83

H9

H10

H11: COULD NOT BE TESTED (see text for details)
*, **, and *** denote significance at 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. Control variables are not shown.
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Hypothesis 9 examined the relationship between bank director experience
represented on a bank‘s audit committee and bank failure. Results showed a positive and
statistically significant result at the audit committee level only in Year 1 (B = 1.66, p <
.10). These results suggest that the likelihood of failure increased if at least one director
on the audit committee had bank director experience, but only in Year 1. However, since
the results reflected positive relationships, Hypothesis 9 was not supported.
Hypothesis 10 examined the relationship between the two categories of
accounting expertise represented on a bank‘s audit committee and bank failure. For
directors with potential accounting expertise, there were significant and negative
relationships at the audit committee level in Year 1 (B = –1.77, p < .10), for nonexecutive
directors on the audit committee in Year 1 (B = –2.24, p < .05), and also for independent
directors on the audit committee in Year 1 (B = –2.25, p <.05). Significant results were
also obtained for nonexecutive directors (B = –1.23, p <.10) and independent directors
(B = –1.22, p < .05) in Year 2. Interestingly, with respect to the presence of the
SPECACCTG variable on the audit committee, none of those results were significant. In
short, these findings suggest that the presence of nonexecutive and independent directors
with potential accounting experience on a bank‘s audit committee indicates a bank was
less likely to fail. Because several of the relationships were negative and significant,
partial support for Hypothesis 10 was obtained.
Hypothesis 11 proposed that the interaction among audit committee directors with
bank work experience, bank director experience, and the two categories of accounting
expertise would result in a lower likelihood of failure than the presence of only one of
those characteristics on the audit committee. However, when the interactions were added
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into the model, the results could not be estimated as there were too few directors
possessing all three of the characteristics. The maximum number of audit committee
directors possessing all three characteristics was three in Year 2. Consequently,
Hypothesis 11 could not be evaluated.
To examine Hypotheses 12–14, a series of binary logistic regressions was
estimated for each year to assess whether the average tenure of audit committee
members, the average tenure of directors on the audit committee with bank work
experience, and the average tenure of directors on the audit committee with either of the
two categories of accounting expertise were negatively related to bank failure. EQUITY,
ADJNPA, C&I, ROA, LOANS, (log) BODSIZE, BODIND, DUALITY, and (log)
BODMEET were used as control variables for the analyses. Additionally, the following
additional variables were used as controls where appropriate: ACSIZE; the NONAC
variables for BANKWORK_ EXP _ONE, BANKDIR_EXP_ONE, POTACCTG_ONE,
SPECACCTG_ONE; and the NONAC AVGBODTEN variables for NONAC directors,
NONAC nonexecutive directors, and NONAC independent directors. All omnibus chisquare tests of model coefficients ranged in chi-square values from 33.49 to 119.36 and
were significant at the p < .01 level. Cox & Snell R2 values ranged from .25 to .61 among
the models for Hypotheses 12–14, with 70–91% of bank failures being correctly
predicted by the models. Results for logistic regressions for Hypotheses 12–14 are
presented in Table 13.

Table 13
Results for Logistic Regression Testing of Hypotheses 12–14
Year 1

Year 2

Expected
Sign

B

ACAVGBODTEN_AC_DIRECTORS_YRS
ACAVGBODTEN_ACNONEXDIR_YRS
ACAVGBODTEN_ACINDEPDIR_YRS

+/–
+/–
+/–

–0.13
–0.12
–0.12

3.36*
2.31
2.38

ACAVGBODTEN_AC_DIRECTORS_YRS*AC_BANKWORK_EXP_ONE
ACAVGBODTEN_ACNONEXDIR_YRS*AC_NONEX_BANKWORK_EXP_ONE
ACAVGBODTEN_ACINDEPDIR_YRS*AC_INDEP_BANKWORK_EXP_ONE

+/–
+/–
+/–

0.33
0.40
0.40

6.02**
7.55***
7.49***

Variable

χ

2

Year 3
B

χ2

3.56*
3.53*
3.73*

–0.06
–0.08
–0.08

1.29
2.28
2.30

0.07
0.05
0.05

0.71
0.32
0.31

0.08
0.07
0.07

0.60
0.54
0.55

–0.19
–0.25
–0.24
–0.39
–0.40
–0.38

2.77*
3.77*
3.55*
2.16
1.91
1.79

–0.08
–0.07
–0.06
–0.13
–0.13
–0.12

0.46
0.42
0.28
0.33
0.33
0.32

B

χ

0.11
–0.12
–0.12

2

H12

H13

H14
ACAVGBODTEN_AC_DIRECTORS_YRS*AC_SPECACCTG_ONE
+/–
–0.21
ACAVGBODTEN_ACNONEXDIR_YRS*AC_NONEX_SPECACCTG_ONE
+/–
–0.33
ACAVGBODTEN_ACINDEPDIR_YRS *AC_INDEP_SPECACCTG_ONE
+/–
–0.35
ACAVGBODTEN_AC_DIRECTORS_YRS*AC_POTACCTG_ONE
+/–
–0.82
ACAVGBODTEN_ACNONEXDIR_YRS*AC_NONEXEC_POTACCTG_ONE
+/–
–1.03
ACAVGBODTEN_ACINDEP_YRS*AC_INDEP_POTACCTG_ONE
+/–
–1.00
*, **, and *** denote significance at 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. Control variables are not shown.

1.53
3.13*
3.45*
2.59
3.04*
2.78*
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Control variables in the model were tested first with the test variables present.
Positive relationships with bank failure (at the p < .05 level) were found for ADJNPA
(Year 1), LOANS (Years 1–3), duality (Year 2), and BODMEET.log (Years 1 and 2). A
significant, negative relationship with bank failure (at the p < .05 level) was found only
for ROA (Year 3) and NONAC_AVGBODTEN_NONACDIR (Year 1).
Hypothesis 12 examined the relationship between audit committee tenure and
bank failure. Results showed significant relationships at the audit committee level both in
Year 1 (B = –0.13, p < .10) and Year 2 (B = 0.11, p < .10). Note that the relationship was
negative in Year 1 but was positive in Year 2 at the audit committee level. There were
also statistically significant negative relationships for nonexecutive and independent
directors on the audit committee in Year 2 (nonexecutive directors: B = –0.12, p < .10;
independent directors: B = –0.12, p < .10). Since Hypothesis 12 was stated in the null
form, it was rejected.
Hypothesis 13 examined the interaction between the tenure of audit committee
members with bank work experience and the corresponding relationship with bank
failure. A positive and significant relationship was noted in Year 1 at the audit committee
level (B = 0.33, p < .05). This finding suggests that as the tenure of audit committee
directors with bank work experience increased, the likelihood of failure also tended to
increase. There were significant, positive results for both nonexecutive and independent
directors in Year 2 (nonexecutive directors: B = 0.40, p < .01; independent directors: B =
0.40, p < .01). Again, since this hypothesis was stated in its null form, it was rejected.
Hypothesis 14 examined the interaction between the tenure of audit committee
members with either of the two levels of accounting expertise and the corresponding
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relationship with bank failure. Results of the logistic regressions reflect significant and
negative relationships for both nonexecutive directors and independent directors with
SPECACCTG experience for each of the two years leading up to failure, and negative
relationships for both nonexecutive and independent directors with POTACCTG
experience in Year 1. See Table 13 for the full results for Hypothesis 14. Since
significant results were found, the null for of Hypothesis 14 is rejected.
Supplemental Analysis
In sensitivity tests, I also employed additional financial ratios that have been
demonstrated in previous research to be reliable predictors of bank failure. For the capital
adequacy dimension, I also controlled for risk-weighted assets to equity; for asset quality,
I also controlled for nonperforming assets to total assets; for loan portfolio mix, I also
controlled for consumer loans to total assets; and for earnings I also controlled for return
on equity. Controlling for these additional variables did not affect my results.
In addition, in other sensitivity tests, I also controlled for whether or not the bank
was headquartered in one of the states with the four highest levels of bank failure during
the review period. My results were robust when I controlled for the ―top 4 failure state‖
variable. I also controlled for a number of other factors associated with the type of audit
firm, the audit firm‘s tenure with the bank, the audit fees paid by the bank, nonaudit fees
paid by the bank, and stock market listing. An argument could be made that the
magnitude of audit fees paid by a bank to its audit firm could be positively associated
with audit quality or at least the level of effort extended by the audit firm. When I
controlled for the log of the audit fees paid by the bank, that variable was not significant
and did not affect my findings. Similarly, whether the audit firm was a local, regional, or
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national public accounting firm could also affect the quality of audit services rendered.
Nevertheless, when I controlled for the type of audit firm, this control variable was not
significant and did not affect my findings. I also controlled for the possibility that the
magnitude of nonaudit fees paid by the bank to the audit firm could have affected the
professional judgment of the audit firm‘s personnel. However, the log of nonaudit fees
was not significant and did not affect my results. Finally, I also controlled for the
possibility that the stock market listing of a bank could affect the degree of scrutiny
applied to the audit by the audit firm personnel. When I controlled for stock market
listing, however, the result was not significant and my findings were robust.

CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSIONS, LIMITATIONS, AND FUTURE RESEARCH
The purpose of this study, believed to be the first of its kind, was to investigate
how select characteristics of directors on a bank‘s board and its audit committee are
related to the bank‘s likelihood of failure. I focused on the following director
characteristics: previous commercial bank work experience, service on the board of
another commercial bank (either previous or contemporaneous service), two categories of
accounting expertise employed in previous research (Naiker & Sharma, 2009), tenure on
the board, and the interaction effects of certain of these predictor variables. Each
hypothesis was tested at the board and audit committee levels for all directors as well as
both nonexecutive directors and independent directors.
Table 14 provides the summary results for the logistic regression testing of each
of the hypotheses included in this study. For directional hypotheses, a hypothesis is
considered supported if the relevant coefficient is statistically significant and its sign is in
the anticipated direction. These are indicated by ―S‖ and the appropriate number of
asterisks (*, **, or ***) depending on the significance level. For null hypotheses, a
hypothesis is considered supported only if statistically significant results are not
obtained—regardless of the sign. For a null hypothesis that has a statistically significant
test result, the initials ―NS‖ indicate not supported followed by the obtained sign of the
relevant coefficient (+ or –) and asterisks indicating level of significance.
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Table 14
Summary Results of Logistic Regression Testing of Hypotheses 1–14
Expected
Sign

Year 1

Year 2

Year 3

BOD_BANKWORK_EXP_ONE
BOD_NONEX_BANKWORK_EXP_ONE
BOD_INDEP_BANKWORK_EXP_ONE

–
–
–

NS**
NS***
NS

NS
NS*
NS

NS*
NS**
NS

BOD_BANKDIR_EXP_ONE
BOD_NONEX_BANKDIR_EXP_ONE
BOD_INDEP_BANKDIR_EXP_ONE

–
–
–

NS
NS
NS

NS
NS
NS

NS
NS
NS

BOD_SPECACCTG_ONE
BOD_NONEX_SPECACCTG_ONE
BOD_INDEP_SPECACCTG_ONE
BOD_POTACCTG_ONE
BOD_NONEX_POTACCTG_ONE
BOD_INDEP_POTACCTG_ONE

–
–
–
–
–
–

NS
NS
NS
NS
NS
NS

NS
NS
NS
NS
NS
NS

NS
NS
NS
NS
NS
NS

–

NS

NS

NS

–

NS

NS

NS

–
–

NS
NS

NS
NS

NS
NS

–

NS

NS

NS

–

NS

NS

NS
(continued)

Variable
H1

H2

H3

H4
BOD_BANKWORK_EXP_ONE*BOD_BANKDIR_EXP_ONE*BOD_SPECACCTG_ONE
BOD_NONEX_BANKWORK_EXP_ONE*BOD_NONEX_BANKDIR_EXP_ONE*BOD_NONEX
_SPECACCTG_ONE
BOD_INDEP_BANKWORK_EXP_ONE*BOD_INDEP_BANKDIR_EXP_ONE*BOD_INDEP_
SPECACCTG_ONE
BOD_BANKWORK_EXP_ONE*BOD_BANKDIR_EXP_ONE*BOD_POTACCTG_ONE
BOD_NONEX_BANKWORK_EXP_ONE*BOD_NONEX_BANKDIR_EXP_ONE*BOD_NONEX
_ POTACCTG_ONE
BOD_INDEP_BANKWORK_EXP_ONE*BOD_INDEP_BANKDIR_EXP_ONE*BOD_INDEP_
POTACCTG_ONE
S = Supported; NS = Not Supported
*, **, and *** denote significance at 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively.
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Table 14 (continued)
Expected
Sign

Year 1

Year 2

Year 3

AVGBODTEN_DIRECTORS_YRS
AVGBODTEN_NONEX_YRS
AVGBODTEN_INDEP_YRS

+/–
+/–
+/–

NS, –**
NS, –**
NS, –**

NS, –**
NS, –**
NS, –**

S
S
S

AVGBODTEN_DIRECTORS_YRS*BOD_BANKWORK_EXP_ONE
AVGBODTEN_NONEX_YRS*BOD_NONEX_BANKWORK_EXP_ONE
AVGBODTEN_INDEP_YRS*BOD_INDEP_BANKWORK_EXP_ONE

+/–
+/–
+/–

NS, –**
NS, –**
NS, –**

NS, –**
NS, –*
S

NS, –**
NS, –*
S

AVGBODTEN_DIRECTORS_YRS*BOD_SPECACCTG_ONE
AVGBODTEN_NONEX_YRS*BOD_NONEX_SPECACCTG_ONE
AVGBODTEN_INDEP_YRS*BOD_INDEP_SPECACCTG_ONE
AVGBODTEN_DIRECTORS_YRS*BOD_POTACCTG_ONE
AVGBODTEN_NONEX_YRS*BOD_NONEXEC_POTACCTG_ONE
AVGBODTEN_INDEP_YRS*BOD_INDEP_POTACCTG_ONE

+/–
+/–
+/–
+/–
+/–
+/–

S
S
S
S
NS, –*
NS, –**

S
S
S
S
S
S

S
S
S
S
S
S

AC_BANKWORK_EXP_ONE
AC_NONEX_BANKWORK_EXP_ONE
AC_INDEP_BANKWORK_EXP_ONE

–
–
–

NS***
NS***
NS***

NS**
NS*
NS*

NS*
NS*
NS*

AC_BANKDIR_EXP_ONE
AC_NONEX_BANKDIR_EXP_ONE
AC_INDEP_BANKDIR_EXP_ONE

–
–
–

NS*
NS
NS

NS
NS
NS

NS
NS
NS

Variable
H5

H6

H7

H8

H9

S = Supported; NS = Not Supported
*, **, and *** denote significance at 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively.

(continued)
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Table 14 (continued)
Variable

Expected
Sign

Year 1

Year 2

Year 3

NS
NS
NS
S*
S**
S**

NS
NS
NS
NS
NS*
NS*

NS
NS
NS
NS
NS
NS

H10
AC_SPECACCTG_ONE
AC_NONEX_SPECACCTG_ONE
AC_INDEP_SPECACCTG_ONE
AC_POTACCTG_ONE
AC_NONEX_POTACCTG_ONE
AC_INDEP_POTACCTG_ONE

–
–
–
–
–
–

H11 – COULD NOT BE TESTED (see text for details)
H12
ACAVGBODTEN_AC_DIRECTORS_YRS
ACAVGBODTEN_ACNONEXDIR_YRS
ACAVGBODTEN_ACINDEPDIR_YRS

+/–
+/–
+/–

NS, –*
S
S

NS, +*
NS, –*
NS, –*

S
S
S

ACAVGBODTEN_AC_DIRECTORS_YRS*AC_BANKWORK_EXP_ONE
ACAVGBODTEN_ACNONEXDIR_YRS*AC_NONEX_BANKWORK_EXP_ONE
ACAVGBODTEN_ACINDEPDIR_YRS*AC_INDEP_BANKWORK_EXP_ONE

+/–
+/–
+/–

NS, +**
NS, +***
NS, +***

S
S
S

S
S
S

+/–
+/–
+/–
+/–
+/–
+/–

S
NS, –*
NS, –*
S
NS, –*
NS, –*

NS, –*
NS, –*
NS, –*
S
S
S

S
S
S
S
S
S

H13

H14
ACAVGBODTEN_AC_DIRECTORS_YRS*AC_SPECACCTG_ONE
ACAVGBODTEN_ACNONEXDIR_YRS*AC_NONEX_SPECACCTG_ONE
ACAVGBODTEN_ACINDEPDIR_YRS *AC_INDEP_SPECACCTG_ONE
ACAVGBODTEN_AC_DIRECTORS_YRS*AC_POTACCTG_ONE
ACAVGBODTEN_ACNONEXDIR_YRS*AC_NONEXEC_POTACCTG_ONE
ACAVGBODTEN_ACINDEP_YRS*AC_INDEP_POTACCTG_ONE
S = Supported; NS = Not Supported
*, **, and *** denote significance at 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively.
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Contrary to expectations, at the board level neither bank work experience, bank
director experience, nor either type of accounting expertise was effective in preventing
bank failure (Hypotheses 1–4). In fact, with respect to bank work experience, the signs
were positive and statistically significant in five instances, and negative—as expected—
in only one instance and never statistically significant. For bank director experience, the
signs were surprisingly positive in six of nine instances and never statistically significant.
Although significant results were not obtained with respect to either special or potential
accounting experience in any period, the signs were as expected in 10 of 18 instances.
With respect to the interaction effects of bank work experience, bank director experience,
and the two categories of accounting expertise, statistically significant results were not
observed for any period, although the signs were as expected in 12 of 18 cases.
All hypotheses that involve average board tenure were proposed in the null form
due to conflicting theories with respect to the anticipated benefits associated with tenure.
Hypothesis 5 predicted that there would be no association between the tenure of directors
on a bank‘s board and the likelihood of bank failure. The results reflect negative signs in
all nine instances, and the results were statistically significant in six of those cases. Thus,
these findings provide support for the idea that directors with longer tenure are associated
with a lower likelihood of bank failure.
Despite the fact that bank work experience was not statistically significant in
preventing bank failure (see Hypothesis 1), when bank work experience was allowed to
interact with average board tenure (Hypothesis 6), an inverse relationship between the
interaction term and bank failure was noted in all nine possible cases, and the results were
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statistically significant in seven of nine cases. These findings suggest that bank work
experience is beneficial in preventing bank failure only when the directors with bank
work experience have served on the bank‘s board for relatively longer periods.
I also examine the interaction effects of average board tenure and the two
categories of accounting expertise employed in this study and their impact on bank
failure. The results with respect to SPECACCTG and board tenure were negative in only
two of nine instances and never statistically significant. However, for the interaction of
POTACCTG and board tenure, the signs were negative in all nine instances and
statistically significant only for nonexecutive and independent directors and only in the
year before failure. These findings indicate that only when nonexecutive and independent
directors‘ potential accounting experience is combined with longer director tenure do the
positive benefits accrue to the bank on whose boards they sit.
This study also investigated the relationships between bank work experience,
bank director experience, and the two categories of accounting expertise possessed by
members of the banks‘ audit committee and bank failure. For bank work experience, the
signs were unexpectedly positive and statistically significant in all nine instances. For
bank director experience, the signs were similarly positive in seven of nine instances but
statistically significant in only one period—at the audit committee level one year prior to
failure. For the audit committee–related POTACCTG variable, the signs were in the
anticipated direction in all nine instances and statistically significant in five of nine cases.
For SPECACCTG represented on the audit committee, the signs were unexpectedly
positive in six of nine cases but never statistically significant. These results suggest that
having audit committee directors with work experience as a chief financial officer, vice
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president of finance, or controller is more effective in preventing bank failure than having
audit committee members with the CPA designation or experience in public accounting.
With respect to the association between average tenure of directors on the audit
committee and bank failure, the signs were negative in eight of nine instances. A
statistically significant inverse relationship between tenure and bank failure was noted in
three of nine cases; a statistically significant positive relationship between tenure and
bank failure was noted in one instance. These results provide limited support for the
expertise hypothesis, suggesting that directors do indeed gain bank-specific and industryspecific knowledge over time that enables them to enhance their ability to meet their
fiduciary responsibilities on behalf of the stockholders.
When average tenure of audit committee members was allowed to interact with
bank work experience at the audit committee level, the interaction term was positively
associated with bank failure in all nine cases and was statistically significant in three of
those cases. These results provide additional support for the notion that directors
possessing bank work experience on bank boards are not an effective deterrent to bank
failure.
Finally, the power of director tenure is again apparent in the results obtained for
the interactive effects of average tenure and the two types of accounting expertise
possessed by audit committee members and their corresponding effects on bank failure.
The signs were negative in all 18 cases and reached significance in 7 of 18 instances.
While the results related to SPECACCTG and POTACCTG and bank failure reflected
negative signs in 12 of 18 instances and statistical significance in 5 of 18 cases (see
Hypothesis 10), once average tenure was allowed to interact with the two types of
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accounting expertise, negative signs were obtained in all 18 cases and statistical
significance was noted in 7 of 18 cases. These results provide additional support for the
notion that directors with longer tenure are associated with a reduced likelihood of bank
failure.
Discussion
A central premise of this study was that the human capital that directors bring to
oversight responsibilities and corporate strategy roles should be inversely related to bank
failure. The specific elements of human capital of interest were previous commercial
bank work experience, director experience, and two categories of accounting expertise
employed in previous academic research. In general, my findings do not provide support
for many of the hypotheses and, in many cases, the actual signs were in the unpredicted
direction. There are a number of potential explanations for these findings.
First, although I could determine from their biographies included in the banks‘
Form DEF 14A statements whether or not a director had previous bank work experience
or previous or contemporaneous bank director experience, in most cases it was not
possible to capture the duration of the bank employment relationship or the bank
directorship. It is possible that the directors were not employed or did not serve as
directors for a sufficiently long enough period to begin to reap the human capital benefits
of those experiences. It may be that banks, in their efforts to put their directors in the best
possible light for stockholders, could have emphasized in director bios what senior
management deemed to be desirable relevant industry experience even when such
experience was not long in duration. Future research into these issues could address the
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duration of such relationships in order to determine if there is a minimum level of service
necessary for the banks to realize the benefits related to these director experiences.
Second, I did not attempt to assess the quality of the experience of the directors
who possessed bank work experience and/or bank directorships. Although many of the
director bios included the names of the banks that had employed the directors or on
whose boards their directors had served, I made no attempt to determine whether those
banks survived or failed during the latest wave of bank failures. Experience, either as an
employee or as a director, with a poorly managed bank with a risky business strategy
clearly would not be as beneficial to the director as experience with a well-run bank with
a properly diversified loan portfolio and reasonable business strategy.
Third, a recent study by Almandoz and Tilcsik (2013) provides intriguing insights
into the human capital dimension of bank directors—especially those with bank work
experience. In a study of 457 commercial and savings banks established between 1996
and 2000, the authors hypothesize and find support for the idea that directors with
experience working in the banking industry as well as real estate professionals may
indeed prove to be liabilities instead of assets when their banks are involved in ―riskfraught activities.‖ Specifically, the study uses a bank‘s asset growth rate and a relatively
high proportion of real estate loans in the bank‘s loan portfolio as proxies for risk-fraught
activities and finds that banks with higher proportions of domain experts (experience as
bankers or as real estate professionals) were more likely to fail by the end of 2012 than
were banks with lower proportions of these experts on their boards. The authors theorize
that their findings are attributable to expert overconfidence and cognitive entrenchment:
―One well-documented and potentially problematic tendency of experts is overconfidence
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in the accuracy of their professional judgment and predictions, which may in turn foster
undue risk-taking or imprudent organizational decisions‖ (p. 6). Dane (2010) defines
cognitive entrenchment as a high degree of stability in a person‘s domain schemas. While
such stability may be desirable in many cases, it may also have undesirable consequences
as domain expertise grows: ―As one acquires domain expertise, one loses flexibility with
regard to problem solving, adaptation, and creative idea generation‖ (Dane, 2010, p. 582).
Thus, domain experts may become wedded to their initial decisions or evaluations and
ignore new information that suggests their initial judgments were inaccurate. Clearly, the
findings of the Almandoz and Tilcsik study help explain the counterintuitive results of
this study.
Another ironic finding of the current study is that directors with experience as a
chief financial officer, vice president of finance, or controller (POTACCTG) were more
beneficial to the banks on whose boards they sat than were directors who were CPAs or
who had worked in public accounting (SPECACCTG). It may be that the directors
possessing the SPECACCTG background were more focused on the accounting-related
aspects of their roles as directors (overseeing the relationship with the external auditors,
working with the internal audit function, ensuring that the bank‘s tax positions were
reasonable, etc.) than they were with assessing the adequacy of the bank‘s loan portfolio
diversification policies, providing oversight with respect to market expansion and bank
acquisitions, etc. An argument could be made that assessing the big picture for the bank
is more in the job requirements of chief financial officers and vice presidents of finance
than is typically expected of CPAs and those employed in public accounting. Future
research should be directed at trying to ferret out the circumstances under which and the
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reasons why directors with a POTACCTG background appear to contribute more to their
banks‘ survivability than do directors with a SPECACCTG background.
This study‘s results with respect to the tenure of directors on the board as well as
those on the audit committee generally provide support for the expertise hypothesis—the
idea that directors‘ ability to meet their oversight responsibilities and to set reasonable
corporate policies and objectives is enhanced as the directors gain industry-specific
knowledge during their tenure as directors. Therefore, banking regulators and others with
an interest in the corporate governance of commercial banks would be well advised not to
limit the tenure of bank directors, as the human capital of these directors improves over
time and strengthens the survivability of their banks. However, future research is needed
to determine if there is a point at which longer board service no longer benefits the bank.
Future research could also address whether the findings with respect to tenure are
applicable across all sizes of banks or whether the findings are relevant only to banks of a
certain size.
Limitations
As is the case with any research, there are limitations associated with this study.
One such shortcoming is that the current research is a study of association and not
causation. Second, even though I tried to design the research so as to control for a large
number of variables, the possibility remains that omitted correlated variables could
explain the results. A third limitation typical of studies relying on biographical
information is that the results are dependent on the accuracy and completeness of the
director information provided by firms in their DEF 14A filings with the SEC. Also,
while this study‘s focus on the commercial banking industry in the United States
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eliminates the need to control for interindustry differences, by concentrating on a single
industry the study‘s results may not be generalizable to other businesses.
The matched-pairs design of this study results in additional limitations. Although
I attempted to find a suitable matching nonfailed bank for each failed bank in the sample
based on the matching criteria discussed earlier, a close match on each of the criteria was
not possible in every instance. It is also possible that in instances in which there are
multiple potential matching banks, the selection of one bank over another could have
affected my results. Another limitation is that the current study focuses on SEC
registrants and, therefore, the results may not be generalizable to private, nonlisted banks.
Moreover, as a result of the financial crisis, the sample period (2008–2011) was
characterized by relatively rapid deterioration in economic conditions in much of the
country; thus, the study‘s results may not be generalizable to periods of less-challenging
economic circumstances. Finally, given that boards and their subcommittees conduct
their activities in private, it is impossible to ascertain the level of influence of individual
directors on their boards‘ deliberative processes. For instance, it is possible that directors
(on the board or the audit committee) possessing banking experience and/or accounting
expertise may not have the appropriate interpersonal skills to enable them to adequately
influence the other board members—thereby negating the positive effects of the
directors‘ experience and expertise. It is also possible that some boards—especially in
smaller banks—are tightly controlled by one or more dominant directors who have the
power to ignore the advice and guidance provided by other directors. These limitations
open up several opportunities for future research.
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